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6  Data protection  inspection 
6.0  Introduction 
6.0.1  The  motivation  for  this  item 
There  are  already data protection  laws  in  serveral 
countries,  and  many  more  are  expected  in  the  next  few 
years.  But  laws  in  themselves,  though  they  may  deter,  do 
not  prevent  abuses:  "Many  people  in  the  industry  feel 
that  the  only  people  they  (data protection  regulations) 
will  affect  are  the  honest:  anyone  who  is  determined  in 
evade  them  will  succeed." 
(Jl).  It was  understandable  that  initially the  main 
interest  should  be  in  recognising  the  existence  of 
troubles  arising  in  the  use  of  personal  data,  and  their 
causes,  and  in  developing  means  of  avoiding  them:  but  the 
time  comes  when  thought  must .be  given  to  the  enforcement 
of  the  laws. 
The  implies  some  means  of  checking  whether  people  are 
complying  with  the  laws:  "Without  proper  inspection  and 
supervision,  the  unscrupulous  will  always  misuse  any 
situation." 
6-1 Il:qn.2).  Some  data  laws  recognise  this  need,  eg  the 
Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  can  demand  access  to 
premises,  computers,  documents  and  other  information  (Sl: 
sections 16,  17,  24).  However,  relatively little has 
been  published  about  such  inspection  for  data  protection 
enforcement,  and  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  about 
how  it could  be  done.  Indeed,  it has  been  argued  (Jl) 
that  it  is  impossible,  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
person  who  operates  it,  to  check  whether  a  system 
satisfies a  data  protection  law;  and  therefore  at  the 
whole  idea  of  data protection  regulation  by  law  is 
unsound. 
Such  uncertainty  and  scepticism deserve  answers,  and  it 
is  the  purpose  of  section  6  to  explore  the  whole  question 
of  the  envisaged  inspections  with  a  view  to  at  least 
narrowing  the  area  of  ignorance  concerning  them. 
6.0.2  The  purposes  of  inspection 
The  prime  objective  of  the  inspection  is  simply  to  check 
to  what  extent  a  particular  system  containing  personal 
data  complies  with  the  appropriate  data  protection 
regulations.  However,  several  other  benefits will 
follow: 
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1.  The  data  user  will  learn  where  his  system  needs 
improvement  in  the  name  of  data protection. 
2.  Evidence  will  be  provided  for  prosecution  of  non-
complicance. 
3.  If  there  were  an  effective method  of  enforcement,  data 
subjects  could  have  more  confidence  that  their 
complaints  of  data  abuse  would  b  effectively pursued • 
4.  Data  users  generally will  be  encouraged  to  comply  with 
data protection regulations;  standards  of  performance 
in  data protection will  be  progressively  improved • 
5.  The  general  standard  of  performance  in  data  protection 
will  be  monitored,  which  will  give  evidence  to 
reassure  or  alert  the  public. 
6.0.3  Structure  of  section 6 
The  structure of  the  rest of  section  6  is  as  follows. 
Insection 6.1  the  special  meaning  with  which  particular 
terms  are  used  throughout  section 6  is  explained. 
Section 6.2 deals  with  some  issues  which  must  be 
considered  before  the  inspection  procedure  can  be  readily 
understood  or  discussed.  In  section 6.3  the  essential 
principles  of  data protection  are  expanded  into  a  set  of 
measures  which  data  users  may  be  expected  to  follow • 
b-3 The  following  sections  6.4  to  6.6  expound  the  actual 
inspection  procedures  for  checking  that  these  measures 
are  being  followed.  Section 6.7 discusses questions 
particularly  related  to  the  person  of  the  inspector, 
section 6.8.  discusses  various  further  questions  which 
relate  to  the  inspection  procedure,  and  finally  section 
6.9 lists materials  referred  to  or  used  in  section 6. 
6.0.4  Referencing  system 
The  following  system  of  referencing  is  used.  Cross 
references  to  sections  of  this  report  are  given  by  the 
number  of  the  section  referred  to.  References  to  the 
bibliography  consist  of  a  capital  letter  followed  by  a 
number;  this  may  be  followed  by  a  colon  and  a  reference 
using  the  reference  system  of  the  document  referred  to. 
Thus  "Hl:p.xx"  refers  to  page  number  xx  of  the  United 
States  HEW  report. 
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6.1  Definitions 
6.1.0  Introduction 
Section  6.1  contains explanations  of  some  terms  which  are 
used  throughout  Section  6  with  particular  meanings.  To 
facilitate  understanding,  a  brief description of  the 
inspection will  now  be  given,  showing  the  context  in 
which  the  terms  arise.  The  terms  are  here  underlined. 
An  organisation will  often  hold  personal  data  which  is 
used  in  several  systems  by  one  or  more  data  users.  This 
date  refers  to data  subjects  and  may  be  covered  by  legal 
or  other  regulations.  To  check  whether  a  system  complies 
with  the  regulations,  a  commissioning  body  (which  may  or 
may  not  be  the  legally-appointed Authority),  may  order  an 
inspection  to  be  carried  out  by  the  inspector,  who  makes 
an  inspection visit, collects  information  and  produces  an 
inspection  report  • 
6.1.1  Definition  of  'organisation' 
The  term  'organisation'  is  used  to  refer  to  the  body 
which  runs  the  system  which  is  being  inspect~~·  The 
organisation  is  regarded  as  being  practically  responsible 
· for  the  system,  is  expected  to  be  able  to  answer  all 
questions  about  it,  and  to  give  the  inspector  the 
practical  powers  he  needs • 
6  -s-In  simple  cases  the  organisation will  be  a  company  or 
other  well-defined  body,  and  will  have  total  legal 
responsibility  for  the  system.  But  the  use  of 
complicated  systems  may  be  shared  by  several  companies, 
and  small  systems  may  be  in  practice  out  of  control  of 
the  nominally  responsible  body,  e.g.  a  student's  research 
file  may  not  be  know  by  the  host  university.  In  such 
cases  the  inspector  may  have  difficulty  in  collecting  the 
information  which  he  needs. 
The  organisation  should  not  be  conceived  necessarily  as 
an  ordinary  commercial  firm.  A large  proportion  of 
personal  data  handling  occurs  in  such  sectors  as  central 
and  local  government,  public  utilities,  and  charities, 
and  the  leisure  use  of  computers  is  increasing  fast.  The 
significance  of  this  for  inspection  is  that  the 
motivation  for  breach  of  the  regulations will  not  always 
be  financial  (cf.6.2.2). 
6.1.2  Definition  of  'system' 
Throughout  section 6,  the  term  'system'  is  used  to  refer 
to  the  totality which  is  the  subject  of  the  inspection. 
The  term  could  apply  to  objects  of  very different  types. 
For  example,  each  of  the  following  could  be  treated  as  a 
system  for  the  purpose  of  inspection: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1.  The  payroll  operations of  a  single organisation. 
2.  All  the  data  processing  activities which  involve 
personal  data  within  one  organisation.  It may  be  more 
efficient  to  inspect  these  together  rather  than 
separately,  though  they  are  in  no  sense  a  unified 
system. 
3.  The  SWIFT  network,  which  links  500  banks  in  15 
different  countries  (1.1.2.2). 
Each  of  these  is  a  system  in  the  sense  that  it has 
boundaries  which  are  conceptually  clear  within  which 
personal  data  is  handled  in  a  way  which  one  might  wish  to 
inspect.  It will  become  clear  that  the  principles  of 
inspection  are  similar  for  all  systems. 
Although  the  main  emphasis  in  data  protection  legislation 
has  been  on  computerised  systems,  the  proposed  method  of 
inspection  is  also  applicable  to  systems  which  do  not 
contain  a  computer • 
6.1.3  Definition  of  'data  user' 
The  term  'data user'  is  used  to  refer  to  the  person  or 
persons  who  in  practice  make  decisions  about  the  system. 
He  will  normally  be  only  a  small  part  of  the 
'organisation',  and  may  or  may  not  be  legally  responsible. 
From  the  inspector's point  of  view,  the  'data  user'  is  a 
part  of  the  organisation which  he  must  mostly  look  to  for 
answers. 
6- 7 In  much  of  section 6,  the distinction  between  the  roles 
of  the  organisation  and  the  data  user  is  not  essential. 
6.1.4  Definition of  'data',  'data subject',  'information' 
Throughout  section 6,  'data'  usually  means  'personal 
data',  and  the  precise  meaning  to  be  given  to  that 
expression will  depend  on  the  regulations.  The  trend  in 
data  protection  is  towards  embracing  any  data  which 
relates  to  an  identified person.  To  save  the  word  'data' 
for  this restricted meaning,  the  word  'information'  is 
used  in  tbis  section  to  refer  to  such  things  as 
particulars of  the  system. 
The  terms  'data subject'  is  used  here  in  what  is  becoming 
its  standard  meaning,  viz.  a  person  to  whom  personal  data 
refers.  The  distinction  between  a  physical  person  and  a 
non-physical  person  (section  3)  is  almost  immaterial  for 
inspection  purposes  (although  of  course  the  inspector 
must  know  what  sort. of  person  is  covered  by  the 
regulations) •  It must  not  be  assumed  that  the  data 
subject  is. the  best  person  to  look  after  nis  interests: 
the  precedent  of  a  child  having  a  legal  guardian  shows 
this. 
6.1.5  Definition  of  'regulations' 
The  main  purpose  of  inspection  (6.0.2)  is  to  check  the 
extent  to  which  some  particular  set  of  rules  relating  to 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
personal  data  is  being  obeyed.  This  set of  rules  is  here 
termed  the  'regulations'.  It  is  not  necessary  that  they 
have  the  force  of  law,  or  be  derived  from  the  law:  they 
may  be  wider  or  narrower  than  this,  at  the  discretion  of 
the  commissioning  body.  For  example,  in  a  voluntary 
inspection  it may  be  convenient  to  cover  only  one  aspect 
of  the  law  during  a  particular  inspection,  inspection 
with  regard  to  the  other  aspects  being  postponed;  or,  in 
following  up  a  specific  complaint,  a  statutory  inspection 
may  be  concerned  primarily  with  the  apparently  delinquent 
parts of  the  system.  However,  the  regulations  must  be 
practically limited  to  data  protection  requirements,  else 
the  scope  of  the  inspection  could  be  impossibly  wide • 
The  regulations  must  be  applicable  to  the  system,  and 
must  be  precise  enough  for  compliance  with  them  to  be 
testable.  It  is  not  the  inspector's  role  to  use  his 
judgement  to  covert  ambiguous  regulations  into  specific 
requirements:  for  this  he  should  refer  to  the 
commissioning  body. 
6.1.6  Definition  of  'commissioning  body',  'Authority' 
It  is  the  commissioning  body  which  initiates  the 
inspection,  determines  its scope,  chooses  the  inspector, 
gives  him  whatever  powers  he  possesse~,  receives  his 
report  and  decides  on  any  such  subsequent  action.  In 
some  circumstances,  the  regulations  may  not  be  identical 
to  the  law,  as  explained  in  the  previous  section  (6.1.5); it is  the  commissioning  body  wh,ich  determines  the 
regulations  which  are  to  be  the  basis  for  the  inspection. 
The  inspector  is  totally subordinate  to  the  commissioning 
body  (subject  to  any  citizen's obligations  under  the 
law) • 
Under  some  data  protection  laws,  there  is  a  central  body 
which  has  legal  responsibilities  and  powers  (among  other 
things)  to  initiate  inspections  to  check  compliance  with 
the  law.  This  body  is  here  termed  the  Authority. 
For  a  statutory  inspection,  the  commissioning  body  is  the 
Authority;  for  a  voluntary  inspection,  some  department  of 
the  organisation. 
6.1.7  Definition of  'inspection',  'inspection visit', 
'inspection  report' 
The  word  'inspection'  is  used  in  two  senses  in  section 6. 
Generally,  it  is  used  to  refer  to  the  whole  art,  science 
and  discipline  of  checking  compliance  with  data 
protection  legislations,  including  (as  will  be  seen  in 
sections  6.2  and  6.8)  many  per~pheral  issues.  More 
particularly,  'an  inspection'  is  used  to  refer  to  a  case 
of  carrying  out  this  checking,  beginning  with  a  decision 
to  inspect  and  ending  when  the  inspection  report  is 
received  by  the  commissioning  body. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
As  part of  an  inspection,  it will  usually  be  necessary 
for  the  inspector  to  go  to  the  places  where  the  system  is 
operated,  to  see  the  system  in  operation  and  to  interview 
the  people  involved.  This  is  what  is  termed  the 
inspection visit,  without  implying  anything  about  the 
length  of  time  or  the  number  of  comings  and  goings  which 
are  required • 
The  immediate  result  of  an  inspection will  be  the 
inspection  report,  in  which  the  inspector  presents  his 
findings.  The  contents  of  this  are  discussed  below 
(6.6.2) • 
6.1.8  Definition of  'inspector' 
The  term  'inspector'  is  used  throughout  section  6  to 
refer  to  the  person  or  persons  who  carry out  an 
inspection;  the  question  of  whether  more  than  one  person 
is  needed  is  considered  later  (6.7.2) • 
6  ·' f I 6.2  Preliminary questions 
6.2.0  Introduction 
In  section 6.2  several  matters  are  discussed  which  must 
be  understood  before  the  inspection  itself  can  be 
treated.  Matters  which  can  be  postponed  are  placed  in 
6.8. 
6.2.1  Actual  and  potential  breaches 
The  regulations  may  be  so  specific,  and  the  inspection  so 
thorough,  that  the  inspector  can  report directly  on  the 
degree  to  which  the  system  complies  with  the  regulations. 
However,  this will  rarely  be  the  whole  story.  It  is  more 
likely  that  the  regulations will  set  out  objectives,  the 
achievement  of  which  requires  various  measures.  If  these 
measures  are  not  carried  out,  this  may  not  itself  be  a 
breach  of  the  regulations,  but  it  is  a  weakness  of  the 
system  which  constitutes  a  risk  that  a  breach  will  occur. 
The  inspector  should  normally direct  most  of  his  effort 
towards  such  potential  breaches. 
An  example  may  make  this  clear.  The  regulations  may  say 
that  the  data  must  be  accurate.  For  most  systems  this  is 
an  impracticable  ideal,  and  therefore  legally 
unenforceable.  However,  the  data  user  will  be  required 
to  closely  approach  the  ideal,  and  to  do  this  must  take 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
suitable measures,  such  as  using  reliable data  sources 
and  data  preparation methods,  and  checking  the  accuracy 
of  the  stored data.  In  turn,  the  inspector  might  check 
the  accuracy  of  the  stored  data,  and  if  he  found  too  many 
inaccuracies  he  would  report  an  actual  breach  of  the 
regulations.  Alternatively  or  in  addition,  he  might 
check  that  the  above-mentioned  suitable measures  have 
been  instituted  and  are  correctly carried  out.  It  they 
are  not,  he  would  report  the  fact  as  a  potential  breach 
of  the  regulations  • 
The  reason  for  this  is  that,  if  there  are  too  many 
potential  breaches,  there  is  a  high  probability  that 
there will  sooner  or  later  be  actual  breaches.  The 
former  are  in  most  cases  much  easier  to  detect  than  the 
latter,  and  are  therefore  a  more  cost-effective  area  for 
inspection.  This  may  present  a  conceptual  difficulty  in 
some  data  users,  who  may  find  themselves  criticised when 
they  think  they  have  actually  done  nothing  wrong • 
If  the  data  user  is  to  be  prosecuted  under  the  law  which 
requires  evidence  of  an  actual  breach,  the  inspector  must 
look  for  it.  The  potential  breaches  will  be  a  good 
starting place  for  his  search. 
6.2.2  Selection of  inspection  areas 
Although  the  inspector  is  in  principle  interested  in  all 
possible  forms  of  non-compliance  and  all  methods  of 
6-13 detecting  them,  pressures  of  economy  will  tend  to 
restrict  him  to  a  small  part  of  the  whole.  A means  of 
making  a  reasonable  selection of  inspection  measures  is 
provided  by  the  concepts  of  risk  analysis,  a  process 
which,  as  part  of  risk  management,  has  been  developed 
from  insurance  management  (P2,W2). 
Broadly  speaking,  risk  analysis  involves  the 
identification of  possible  breaches  of  the  regulations 
and  then  estimating  the  importance  of  each  possible 
breach.  The  importance  of  a  possible  breach  depends  on 
the  following  factors: 
1.  The  underlying  reasons  or  pressure  for  the  breach. 
The  reasons  covers  everything  which  might  cause 
someone  to  commit  a  breach  and  includes: 
- financial  gain 
- inquisitiveness 
- laziness 
- ignorance 
- incompetence 
- administrative  zeal 
- criminal  purposes,  e.g.  for  blackmail 
- coercion  by  others 
- intellectual  challenge 
- acquisition of  information  with  which  to  please  or 
impress  others 
- hunger  for  power. 
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2.  The  opportunity  for  occurrence  of  the  breach.  This 
would  involve  an  assessment  of  the  ease  of  committing 
the  breach,  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  relevant 
counter  measures. 
3  The  seriousness  of  the  consequences  of  the  breach • 
One  could  attempt  to  quantify  the  'pressure',  the 
'opportunity'  and  the  'seriousness',  and,  by  multiplying 
the  three  values,  obtain  a  numerical  weight  to  express 
the  importance  of  each  possible  breach.  However,  the 
accuracy  with  which  these  variables  can  be  estimated  will 
rarely give  much  confidence  in  the  result.  It  is 
probably  better  to  use  the  approach  to  reveal  what  are 
qualitatively  the  most  important potential  dangers  of  the 
system. 
The  choice  of  inspection measures  to  be  employed  in  a 
particular  inspection  should  be  influenced  by  two  other 
factors: 
their  expected  effectiveness  in  disclosing  the  type  of 
breach  under  consideration 
their  estimated  cost  (including  both  personnel  and 
computer  time)  to  apply  • 
As  with  the  analysis  of  the  consequences  of  the  breach, 
the  value  of  this  approach  to  inspection  comes  more  from 
the  concentration  of  thought  on  aspects  which  are 
relatively worthwhile  than  from  attempts  to  ascribe 
numerical  values  to  these  factors • 
b-1) 6.2.3  The  powers  of  the  inspector 
To  carry  out  the  inspection,  the  inspector  may  need  these 
powers: 
1.  To  obtain  answers  to  questions. 
2.  To  see  and  make  temporary  copies  of  documents  and  file~. 
3.  To  speak  to  people  in  private. 
4.  To  inspect  buildings  and  equipment. 
5.  To  carry  out  computer  runs  using  the  hardware,  programs 
and  data  used  by  the  system. 
6.  To  contact data  subjects. 
7.  To  use  temporary  working  accommodation  and  facilities 
within  the  organisation. 
The  inspector  derives  his  powers  from  the  commissioning 
body,  and  if  he  finds  that  they  are  frustrated  it  is  to 
that  body  which  he  must  look.  If  his  powers  remain 
insufficient  for  him  to  carry  out  parts  of  his  inspection, 
he  should  say  so  in  his  report  to  the  commissioning  body. 
It  is  not  the  inspector's  job  to  decide  what  powers  he  is 
entitled  to  have,  and  he  should  recognise  that  there  are 
legitimate  reasons  why  they  may  be  limited. 
6.2.4  Statutory  and  Voluntary  Inspections 
Two  different  types  of  inspection  are  envisaged.  It  is 
convenient  to  display  their  differences  in  parallel: 
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Statutory  inspection 
The  statutory  inspection 
may  be  required  by  law. 
Its  immediate  purpose  is 
to detect  non-compliance 
with  the  data protection 
law. 
It  is  initiated  by  the 
Authority,  which  (subject 
to  the  law)  determines  its 
timing  (perhaps  in  con-
sultation with  the  date 
user),  scope  and  stringency. 
If  a  serious  breach  of  law 
is  found,  the  consequences 
for  the  system  and  its  user 
may  be  catastrophic. 
The  inspector  must  be 
acceptable  to  the  Authority  • 
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Voluntary  inspection 
The  voluntary  inspection 
is  not  required  by  law  • 
Its purpose  is  to  check, 
for  the  benefit  of  the 
organisation,  the  degree 
of  compliance  of  the 
system  with  the  data 
protection  law  • 
It  is  initiated  by  the 
organisation,  which 
determines  its  timing, 
scope  and  stringency. 
If  serious  faults  are 
found,  drastic  action 
may  be  needed,  but  on 
a  time  scale  determined 
by  the  organisation. 
The  inspector  is  appointed 
by  the  organisation. In  case  of difficulty,  he 
can  appeal  to  the  Authority 
for  whatever  powers  (within 
the  law)  he  needs  to  carry 
out  the  inspection. 
Statutory  inspections  will 
occur  when  the  Authority 
considers  them  necessary. 
His  powers  will  be 
determined  by  the 
organisation,  and  can  be 
extended  or  curtailed  at 
any  time. 
Voluntary  inspections 
occur  at  the  convenience 
of  the  organisation. 
Despite  these  differences,  most  aspects  of  inspection  are 
similar,  and  it turns  out  to  be  unnecessary  to 
distinguish  the  two  types  in  most  of  the  following 
discussion. 
6.2.5  An  inspection  paradox 
It  is  often  said  that  any  inspection  procedure  can  be 
defeated.  It  is  also  asserted  that  any  abuse  can  in 
principle  be  detected.  These  statements  can  be 
reconciled  by  accepting  that  any  fixed  object  (inspection 
procedure/system of  data  abuse)  can  be  bypassed  by  a 
moveable  object  (system  or  data  abuse/inspection 
procedure) •  The  moral  for  inspectors  is  that  they  must 
not  become  set  in  rigid  inspection  procedures,  but  must 
vary  them,  and  improve  them  as  experienc~ accumulates  and 
technology  advances. 
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The  subsidiary purposes  of data  inspection  (6.0.2)  do  not 
depend  on  one  hundred  percent  success  by  the  inspector, 
and  nor  does  law  enforcement  in  general • 
6.2.6  Strictness 
The  word  'strictness'  is  used  with  reference  to  at  least 
three different  aspects  in  this  subject,  and  it may  help 
reduce  confusion  to  discuss  them  briefly: 
1.  Strictness of  regulations  means  the  extent  to  which 
the  regulations  impose  burdens  and  limitations  upon 
the  data  user.  For  example,  a  regulation  requiring 
answering  within  one  week  a  data  subject's demand  for 
a  copy  of  the  data  which  refers  to  him  is  stricter 
than  one  requiring  answering  within  one  month,  and 
both  are  stricter  than  one  requiring  answering  without 
specifying  a  time  limit.  To  some  extent  strictness 
and  preciseness  to  together,  for  example,  a  regulation 
saying  that data  must  be  'accurate'  is  too  imprecise 
to  be  regarded  as  strict  (unless  it  is  known  that  it 
will  be  interpreted  in  a  particular  way,  in  which  case 
it  is  the  implicit  regulations  which  are  strict). 
2.  Strictness of  compliance  refers  to  the  closeness  with 
which  the  data  user  satisfies  the  regulations.  In 
essence,  it  is  this  which  the  inspection  is  concerned 
to  assess.  If  the  regulations  are  imprecise,  there 
may  be  a  large  element  of  judgement  in  assessing  the 
degree  of  compliance • 3.  Strictness of  inspection  refers  to  the  thoroughness  of 
the  inspection  procedure,  that  is  the  confidence  one 
can  have  that  its assessment  of  the  degree  of 
compliance  is  accurate.  The  main  aim  of  Section  6  is 
to  specify  an  inspection procedure  which  can  be  as 
strict as  will  ever  by  necessary,  but  it  is  expected 
that  the  full  rigour  will  very  rarely  be  used.  This 
question  is discussed  further  in 6.8.2. 
6.2.7  Global  uniformity 
There  are  several  factors  which  may  influence  the 
inspection  procedure: 
1.  The  content  of  the  regulations.  The  data  protection 
laws  of different  countries differ  considerably  in 
their .scope,  precision  and  style. 
2.  The  hardware  of  the  inspected.system,  which  might  be 
anything  between  a  pocket-sized  notebook  and  a  world-
wide  communications  network. 
3.  The  desired  strictness  (6.2.6)  of  the  inspection 
4.  The  social,  political  and  ethical  environment  of  the 
system,  e.g.  the  tradition of  complying  with  or 
evading  laws,  the  tendency  to  co-opeate  with  Authority. 
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If  it proved  necessary  to  devise  a  correspondingly  wide 
range  of  inspection  procedures  to  suit all  these 
possibilities,  the  whole  subject  would  be  unsatisfactory. 
It  is  here  contended  that  this  is  not  necessary:  the 
inspection procedure  which  is  offered  provides  a  suitable 
framework  for  any  data  protection  inspection,  and  nearly 
all  the material  that  would  be  needed.  The  only 
substantial  changes  which  might  be  needed  are  the 
omission  of  those  parts  which  are  not  required  by  the 
particular  regulations,  or  because  of  the  hardware  of  the 
system,  and  a  relaxation of  the  thoroughness  of  the 
inspection  in  appropriate  circumstances. 
The  main  reason  for  this  is  that  the  principles  which 
underlie  all data protection  regulations  can  be  related 
directly  to  a  series of  aspects  of  the  system which  are 
amenable  to  inspection,  as  is  shown  mostly  in  sections 
6.3  and  6.5 • 6.3  The  principles of  data protection 
6.3.0  Introduction 
In  section 6.3  the  few  essential principles  of  data 
protection  are  discussed  and  related  to  several 
formulations  in  the  literature.  From  them  flow  the 
regulations  (6.1.5)  and  from  these  the  requirements  that 
the  inspection  must  check  (see  especially 6.5). 
Following  the  Lindop  report  (Ll:l.ll),  the  view  taken 
here  is  that data protection  should  not  be  regarded  as 
simply  a  battle  between  data  user  and  data  subject. 
There  is  a  third  interested  party  (society  at  large),  and 
the  purpose  of  data  protection  is  to  produce  the  right 
balance  between  the  interests of  all  three  parties,  which 
sometimes  (but  by  no  means  always)  clash. 
The  principles  of  data protection fall  under  four 
headings: 
- notifications 
- data  quality 
- legitimate  processes 
- restricted  access 
to  which  it  is  convenient  to  add  two  factors  which 
practically  support  them 
- personnel 
- control. 
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These  headings,  elastically interpreted,  are  believed  to 
cover  the  whole  subject  of  data  protection,  but  it  is  not 
claimed  that  there  are  well-defined  boundaries  between 
their  domains • 
It will  be  noticed  that  these  headings,  as  developed 
below,  do  not  cover  several  issues  which  are  often 
treated  with  data protection,  such  as  the  protection  of 
national  sovereignty,  tariffs  on  transborder  data  flows, 
protection of  jobs.  These  (whether  admirable  or 
damnable)  are  here  considered  extraneous  to  data 
protection. 
In  section 6.3  the  complete  range  of  possible  regulations 
is  covered  (unless  some  are  inadvertently  omitted) ;  it  is 
not  supposed  that all of  these  will  actually  be  found  in 
any  one  set  of  regulations,  and  therefore  phases  like 
"the data  user  must"  should  be  interpreted  as  meaning  "a 
possible  regulation  is  that  the  data  user  must" • 
6.3.1  Notifications 
6.3.1.0  Introduction 
Notification  covers  the  need  for  facts  relating  to  the 
system  being  made  known  in  various  ways.  The  motivation 
behind  this  is  that  people  are  much  less  apprehensive  of 
systems  about  which  they  know,  and  about  which  they  can 
easily  find  out  more.  It  is  further  considered  desirable 
t-23 to  inform  the  public  generally  about  the  ways  in  which 
personal  data  is  used.  This  is  embodied  in  the  first 
principle  in  one  of  the  first  specifications  of  data 
protection: 
"There  must  be  no  personal  data  record-keeping  systems 
whose  very  existence  is  secret."  (Hl:p.xx) 
Related  to  this  is  what  is  known  as  the  easy-access 
philosophy  (F2),  which  wishes  to  make  it as  easy  as 
possible  for  data  subjects  to  find  out  what  they  are 
entitled  to  know,  and  correspondingly  places  the  duty  of 
disclosure  and  publication  on  others,  in  particular  on 
the  data  user  and  the  Authority.  Badly-formulated 
requests  for  information  (e.g.  incoherent  telephone 
complaints)  should  be  handled  sympathetically,  and  the 
data  user  should  consider  explaining  the  data  subject's 
rights  to  him. 
The  various  forms  of  notification  are  discussed  below 
under  three  headings.  Technical  aspects  of  the  data 
subject's right  of  access  are  also  discussed  in .section 5. 
6.3.1.1  Particulars  of  the  systems 
This  refers  to  the  requirements  to  disclose  some 
particulars of  the  system variously  to  the  Authority,  to 
data  subjects,  and  to  the  public: 
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1.  The  purposes  of disclosure  to  the  Authority  are  to 
enable  the  Authority  to  exercise  control  over  the 
system,  to  give  the  Authority  information  to  publish, 
and  perhaps  to  provide  the  Authority  with  information 
about  systems  in  general • 
2.  The  purposes  of  disclosure  to  data  subjects  are  to 
give  them  the  opportunity  to  exercise  their  rights 
with  respect  to  the  system  (e.g.  to  see  a  copy  of  the 
data  which  refers  to  them),  to  help  them  to  know  the 
likely consequences  of  their  being  data  subjects  and 
to  reassure  them  that  the  system  can  bear  scrutiny. 
3.  The  purpose  of disclosure  to  the  public  are  to  inform 
data  subjects  and  potential data  subjects  of  systems 
which  may  refer  to  them,  and  to  raise  the  level  of 
public  awareness  generally  • 
The  following  particulars  of  the  system  may  have  to  be 
disclosed: 
- its  name 
- its nature 
- all  uses  and  purposes 
- the  classes of  data  subjects 
- the  approximate  numbers  of  data  subjects  in  those 
classes 
- the  types  of personal  data  held 
- the  sources  of  data - all types  of  use  within  the  organisation  and  the 
relationships  of  the  users 
- who  outside  the  organisation  has  access  to  the  data 
and  for  what  purpo~es 
- the  person  legally  responsible  for  the  system 
- the  person within  the  organisation  and  address  who 
should  be  contacted  for  further  information  about  the 
system 
- where  data  is  stored 
- the  retention period  and  method  of  disposal  of  the 
data 
- the  procedures  to  be  followed  by  a  person  who  wishes 
to  know  whether  he  is  a  data  subject  of  the  system, 
and  if  so  to  see  the  content of  his  record  and  to 
object  to  it. 
The  data  user  may  also  have  to  disclose  promptly  any 
substantial  changes  in  the  particulars given  in  the 
formidable  list. 
Under  some  laws,  at least part of  this  information  is 
published  in  a  register,  which  provides  the  main  means 
by  which  a  person  can  find  out  of  which  systems  he  may 
be  a  data  subject. 
The  extent  to  which,  and  the  circumstances  in·which, 
this  information  must  be  communicated  to  the  data 
subject will  be  stated  in  the  regulations. 
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An  additional  requirement  of  the  regulations  may  be  to 
notify  the  data  subject,  when  he  is  asked  to  give  data, 
whether  he  is  required  to  give  data  under  some  legal 
obligation  and  if  so  which,  or  whether  it  is  a 
contractual  necessity,  or  whether  there  is  some  other 
reason.  He  may  have  a  right  to  know  the  consequences  of 
a  refusal  to  give  the  data  • 
A particular  case  of  notification which  is  not  often 
required  is  as  follows: 
"Assure  that  no  data  about  an  individual  are  made 
available  from  the  system  in  response  to  a  demand  for 
data  made  by  means  of  compulsory  legal  process,  unless 
the  individual  to  whom  the  data  pertain  has  been 
notified  of  the  demand"  (Hl:p.63) 
6.3.1.2  Data  subject's  access  to  his  record 
The  regulations  may  provide  that  the  data  subject  has  the 
right  to  know  what  data  referring  to  him  is  kept.  This 
right  may  be  subject  to  some  restrictions  for  the  benefit 
of  the  data  subject,  the  data  user  or  a  third  party. 
The  circumstances  in  which  the  data  subject  can  have  a 
copy  of  his  record  may  be  specified,  whether  at  a 
particular  time  (such  as  on  entry  to  the  system),  or 
regularly  (e.g.annually),  or  on  demand  ·by  the  data  subject  • 
6-Z7 In  any  case,  the  form  of  the  disclosure will  probably 
have  to  be  suitable  tor  the  layman,  that  is,  be  in  plain 
language  with  all codes  adequately  explained.  It may  be 
that  the  real  meaning  of  a  data  item  is  defined  by  the 
use  to  which  it  is  put  within  the  system,  and  to  explain 
this  to  a  data  subject  could  be  diffic~lt. 
The  data  user  may  be  entitled  to  charge  a  fee  in  some 
circumstances  for  ~he disclosure  to  a  dat~ subject  of  his 
record. 
The  possible  rights  of  a  Qata  subject  to  criticise  the 
content  of  his  record,  and  to  make  additions  to  it,  are 
treated  below  under  data quality  (6.3.2). 
6.3.1.3  Registration  fee 
It is  convenient  to  include  under  'notifications'  the 
possible  requirement  of  the  data  user  to  pay  a  fee  to  the 
Authority.  This  fee  may  be  paid  once,  at  the  time  of 
initial  registration  or  licensing  of  the  system  (as  in 
Sweden),  or  annually. 
6.3.2  Data  quality 
This  heading  covers  the  requirements  that  the  personal 
data  should  be  true,  accurate,  sufficient,  not 
misleading,  up-to~date.  It  is  convenient  to  include  with 
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these  the  requirement  that  the  data  be  no  more  than  is 
necessary,  and  that  it  be  deleted  when  it  is  no  longer 
needed,  though  logically  these  follow  from  the  principle 
of  restricted  access  (6.3.4) • 
The  implications  of  each  of  these  requirements  depend  on 
the  use  which  may  be  made  of  the  data.  For  example,  data 
is  not  up-to-date  if  it leads  to  decisions  and  operations 
which  are  substantially worse  (particularly  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  data  subject)  than  more  up-to-date 
data  would  lead  to.  Again,  the  necessity  of  data  is 
relative  to  how  it is  intended  to  use  it. 
Some  data protection  laws  explicitly  forbid  the  storage 
of  certain  types  of  data.  For  example.  the  Swedish  law 
(Sl:  section 4),  shows  that  permission will  not  normally 
be  given  for  storing  data  relating  to  a  person's  criminal 
offences  or  health  (among  other  things),  and  the  French 
law  (Fl:  article 31)  forbids  in  general  data  indicating 
racial  origins,  or  political,  philosophical  or  religious 
opinions,  or  trade  union  membership.  Such  data  would 
fail  the  test  of  necessity  • 
The  Swedish  law  (Sl:  article 9)  uniquely  has  a  requirement 
that  in  some  cases  data  relating  to  some  persons  must  be 
included.  This  provision,  which  is  covered  by  the  above 
principle  of  sufficiency,  is  appropriate  for  such  systems 
as  those  dealing  with  licenced drivers,  improper  exclusion 
from  which  could  be  damaging  to  the  data  subject  • Three  further  requirements  which  occur  in  the  literature 
come  under  the  heading  of  data quality: 
1.  The  data  subject's  right  to  challenge  the  quality of 
data  and  add  a  note  of  dispute: 
"Maintain  procedures  that  (i)  allow  an  individual 
who  is  the  subject  of  data  in  the  system  to  contest 
their  accuracy,  completeness,  pertinence,  and  the 
necessity  for  retaining  them;  (ii)  permit  data  to  be 
corrected  or  amended  when  the  individual  to  whom 
they  pertain  so  requests;  and  (iii)  assure,  when 
there  is  disagreement  with  the  inqividual  about 
whether  a  correction  or  amendment  should  be  made, 
that  the  individual's  claim  is  noted  and  included  in 
any  subsequent  disclosure  or  dissemination  of  the 
disputed  data."  (Hl:p.63) 
2.  What  is  termed  error  correction  propagation  (5.5) 
requires  the  previous  recipients  of  data  should  be 
informed  whenever  the  data  needs  correction  or 
deletion  (Gl:pp.Sl-82). 
3.  The  technique  of  depersonalisation  permits  the 
separation  at  an  early  stage  of  the  part  of  the  data 
which  links  it  to  a  particular  identifiable  person  from 
the part  which  is  needed  for  the  purposes  of  the  system. 
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If  this  separation  can  be  made  completely  and 
irreversibly  the  principle  of  necessity would  require 
it to  be  done  as  soon  as  possible;  if the possibility 
or  re-linking  the  two  parts  of  the  data  must  be 
preserved,  the  princple of  restricted  access  (6.3.4) 
requires  that  this  re-linking  be  carefully 
controlled  • 
6.3.3  Legitimate  processes 
This  section  is  concerned  with  the  principle  that 
processes  which  are  carried  out  on  personal  data  should 
be  legitimate  in  the  sense  discussed  below;  the  following 
section  (6.3.4)  is  concerned  with  preventing  access  to 
data  for  other  processes.  'Legitimate processing'  covers 
th(ee  requirements: 
1.  The  essential purpose  of  the  system  must  be  acceptable, 
for  at  least ·one  o~  the  follo~ing reasons: 
it is  agreed  by  all  interested parties,  in 
particular  the  data  subject 
- it is  authorised  by  the  Authority,  e.g.  at  time  of 
licensing 
it is  explicitly required  or  permitted  by  law 
- it  is disclosed  by  the  data  user  in  an  adequate 
man.ner 
it can  be  reconciled  with  social  and  moral 
considerations  • 
6- 3} Under  different  systems  of  regulations  some  of  these 
reasons  may  not  be  sufficient;  for  example  the Swedish 
law  (Sl:  section  2)  admits  only  reasons  like  the 
second  and  third. 
2.  The  individual  processes  within  the  system  must  be 
acceptable  on  similar  grounds.  For  example,  the 
collection of  data  by  threat,  deceit  or  invasion  of 
privacy  may  be  forbidden.  The  algorithms  by  which  the 
system operates  must  be  fair,  e.g.  not  including 
unjustified  racial discrimination  or  crude  rules.  Any 
data  which  is disputed  by  the  data  subject  must  be 
treated  with  appropriate  reservations. 
3.  The  processes  must  be  carried  out  correctly,  e.g.  not 
impaired  by  program  bugs  or  operator  error  in  loading 
a  wrong  magnetic  tape. 
These  requirements  go  to  the  very  heart  of  the  processing 
or  personal  data  and  have  far-reaching  implications  for  · 
the data  user.  The  first  requirement  is  found  in  many 
formulations,  e.g. 
"Information  should  be  regarded  as  held  for  a  specific 
purpose  and  not  be  used,  without  appropriate 
authorisation,  for  other  purposes."  (Yl:p.l83) 
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"There  must  be  a  way  for  an  individual  to  prevent 
information  about  him  that  was  obtained  for  one  purpose 
from  being  used  or  made  available  for  other  purposes 
without  his  consent"  (Hl:p.xx) 
data  or  processing  which  might  lead  to  unfair 
discrimination  needs  special  authorisation  (E2:3) 
"Personal  data  should  be  handled  only  to  the  extent  and 
for  the  purposes  made  known  when  they  are  obtained,  or 
subsequently  authorised"  (Ll:  section  21.09(2)) 
The  second  and  third  requirements  are  most  referred  to 
only  obliquely  in  the  literature,  e.g  • 
"must  take  precautions  to  prevent  misuse  of  the  data" 
(Hl:p.xxl) 
"must  not  threateri human  identity,  nor  human  rights, 
nor  privacy,  nor  the  liberties of  the  individual,  nor 
public  liberties"  (Fl:  article 1) 
computer  processing  is  not  adequate  for  appraising 
human  conduct  (Fl:  article  2) 
"Every  person  has  the  right  to  know  of  and  challenge 
information  and  reasoning  used  in  c·ompu te  r i zed 
pr6cessing"  (Fl:  article  3) 
6  .. -3  3 "Precautions  should  be  taken  against  any  abuse  or 
misuse  of  information."  ( El:  8) 
"Care  should  be  taken  in  coding  value  judgements." 
(Yl:p.l84). 
However,  the  Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  feels 
empowered  to  intervene  under  section  6  and  18  of  the 
Swedish  law  to  prevent  what  are  considered  to  be  unfair 
processes  (Xl),  and  there  is  a  trend  of  public  discussion 
in this direction.  For  these  reasons  inspection  must  be 
at  least capable  of  application  to  requirements  for 
legitimate processing,  whenever  they  find  their  way  into 
the  regulations. 
However,  in  view  of  their  quasi-judicial  character,  the 
inspector  should  beware  of  making  decisions  in  terms  of 
these  requirements,  but  should  report  facts  which  he 
believes  may  be  reievant  to  such  decisions. 
A further  caution  should  be  given  against  interpreting 
these  requirements  only  in  a  negative  form:  often  the 
interests  of  the  data  subject  require  not  that  the 
processing  should  be  prevented  because  of  some ·possible 
fault,  but  that  it be  carried  out  thoroughly  and  on  time 
- a  payroll  calculation,  for  example. 
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6.3.4  Restricted  access 
This  heading  covers  requirements  that  there  should  be  no 
access  to  personal  data  except  for  purposes  which  are 
permissible  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section  (6.3.3) • 
There  are  several  types  of  access  to  be  considered,  in 
computer  parlance:  read,  write,  amend,  append,  execute, 
erase.  Of  these,  read  access  is  the  one  of  greatest 
concern  in  data  protection,  but  the  other  types  should  be 
borne  in  mind • 
Examples  of  this  type  of  requirement  in  the  literature 
are  numerous,  for  example: 
"Access  to  information  should  be  confined  to  those 
authorised  to  have  it for  the  purpose  for  which  it was 
supplied."  (Yl:p.l83) 
The  Data  Inspeciion  Board  shall  regulate  what  data  may 
be  accessible,  what  may  be  issued,  the  keeping  and 
selection of  data,  and  its control  and  security 
(Sl:  section 6.6-9) 
the  organisation  must  protect data  "from  any 
anticipated  threats  or  hazards  to  the  security  of  the 
system"  (Hl:p.55) 
6- J). "Statistical data  should  be  released  only  in  aggregate 
form  and  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  impossible  to  link 
the  information  to  a  particular  person."  (El:lO) 
••Access  to  the  information  stored  should  be  confined  to 
persons  who  have  a  valid  reason  to  know  it."  (El:9) 
The  following  requirements  come  under  the  heading 
restricted  access: 
1.  The  system  should  obtain data  only  from  permissible 
sources. 
2.  Data  within  the  system  should  be  protected  against 
access  from  outside  the  system. 
3.  Data  should  be  accessed  with  the  system  only  as 
permitted;  if  it  is practicable  to  partition  the  data 
so  that parts  of  the  system  which  do  not  need  some  of 
the  data  cannot  access  it,  that  should  be  done. 
4.  Data  should  leave  the  system  only  to  permitted 
recipients. 
5.  Data  leaving  the  system  should  be  depersonalised  if 
possible  (cf.6.3.2). 
6.  Statistical output  should  not  permit  fortuitous 
indentification  of  individuals  (cf.Ll:  sections  26.06-9). 
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Several  of  these  requirements  are  partly met  by  the 
security  arrangements  which  are  normal  in  good  computer 
practice  (cf.Wl),  but  the  emphasis  for  data protection  is 
more  on  preventing  information  going  out  rather  than 
preventing  unwanted  influences  coming  in • 
6.3.5  Personnel 
The  requirements  in  the  previous  sections 6.3.1-4  are  so 
numerous  and  far-reaching  that  they  imply  actions  which 
in  some  cases  will  affect  the  whole  of  the  organisation  • 
Since  this will  involve  many  different sorts of  people  in 
the  organisation,  it  is  considered  worthwhile  to  identify 
them  here  as  a  distinct  aspect  which  must  be  inspected, 
although  in  a  sense  it  is  implicit  in  the  previous 
requirements • 
Some  people  would  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  inspector 
should  focus  his  attention primarily  on  the  people  in  the 
organisation:  if these  are  right,  the  system will  be 
right;  and  if  the  people  are  not  right,  it  is  unlikely 
that  the  system will  be.  This  is  perhaps  going  too  far: 
1.  Even  good  people  have  bad  patches,  and  bad  people  have 
good  patches,  so  their  actual  level  of  performance  in 
important  patches  needs  checking • 2.  Some  system  are  less dependent  than  others  on  perfect 
human  operation,  as  discussed  in  the  following  section 
(6.3.6). 
3.  It is  perhaps  even  more  difficult  to  make  a  sound 
judgement  of  people  than  of mechanisms. 
4.  If  the  result  from  inspection  are  to  be  used  in  legal 
proceedings  against  the  data  user,  objective  evidence 
of  a  breach  of  the  regulations  is  likely  to  be 
necessary. 
In  formulations  in  the  literature this  aspect  is  only 
occasionally  made  explicit: 
In  the  Swedish  law,  there  is  a  responsible  keeper  of 
each  file  who  has  many  duties,  and  must  not  reveal  what 
he  had  learned  about  the  personal  circumstances  of  any 
individual  (Sl:l3) 
An  organisation  should  "Identify  one  person  immediately 
reponsible  for  the  system  •••  "  (Hl:p.54) 
It should  "Take  affirmative  action  to  inform  each  of 
its employees  •••  about  all  the  safeguard  requirements 
(Hl:p.54) 
Computer  staff  should  be  bound  by  rules  of  conduct  and 
professional  secrecy  (El:9) 
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The  following  requirements  are  intended  to  cover  this 
aspect  of  data  protection: 
1.  There  should  be  a  person  who  is  identified  as 
responsible  for  data  protection  throughout  the 
organisation,  with  the  authority,  information  and 
resources  to  see  that all  requirements  are  met • 
2.  All  staff are  selected,  trained,  given  instruction, 
and  encouraged  to  carry  out  their  work  with 
appropriate  regard  to  the  principles of  data 
protection. 
3.  The  working  conditions  facilitate  the  satisfying  of 
data  protection  requirements. 
Practical  means  for  meeting  these  requirements  will  be 
treated  in  the  inspection visit section  of  this  report 
(6.5.2).  At  the  present  relatively early  stage  in  the 
discipline  of  data  protection,  it  is  likely  that  many 
organisations will  be  uncertain  about  this  administrative 
aspect  • 
6.3.6  Control 
If  an  activity  is  important,  it  is  worth  devoti'ng  an 
appreciable  part  of  the  available  effort  to  ensuring  that  the 
activity takes  place  as  required.  It  is  not  enough  to  issue 
issue  orders:  one  must  check  that  they  are  carried  out. This  is  what  is  referred  to  here  as  'control'. 
Experience  of  financial  auditors  indicates  that  control 
is  an  essential part of  any  complicated  human  system  if 
it  is  to  work  satisfactorily.  Some  would  suggest  that 
the  main  task  of  an  inspector  is  to  check  that 
appropriate  control  mechanisms  (in  the  broad  sense  of  the 
word)  exists,  and  that  they  work  as  intended.  Certainly 
this  simplifies  the  inspector's  work,  and  reduces  the 
amount  of direct  checking  of  the  system  which  is  needed. 
The  method  of  working  of  control  is  this.  Separate  from 
the  mechanism  which  is  intended  to  perform  some  task, 
there  must  be  a  second  mechanism  which  measures  the 
quality  and  quantity  of  the  first one's  performance  of 
its task,  and  has  the  means  of  correcting  it when  it  is 
deficient.  (An  example  of  this sort  of  process  is  found 
in  many  branches  of  manufacturing,  in  which  there  is  a 
separate department  for  quality  assurance.  Typically 
this  takes  samples  from  the  end  of  the  production  line 
and  tests  them.  If  the  standard  of  the  samples  is 
acceptable,  the  untested  units  are  released  for 
distribution.  If  the  standard  of  the  sample  is  too  low, 
the  whole  batch  from  which  they  were  taken  will  be 
rejected.  And  if  too  many  batches  have  to  be  rejected, 
corrective  action  on  the  production  line will  be  taken.) 
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The  two  stages  (measurement  or  detection,  and  correction) 
are  conceptually  separate  but  are  often  combined • 
Inspection  itself corresponds  to  the  first stage,  and  a 
data protection  inspector  will  therefore  be  impressed  if 
the  system  contains  its  own  internal  inspection 
activity. 
A related  feature  is  what  is  called  the  resilience  of  the 
system,  that  is,  its ability  to  perform  acceptably  as  a 
whole  when  parts  of  it are  performing  badly.  A common 
method  of  giving  resilience  to  a  human  system  is 
segregation of duties,  so  that  the  person  who  can 
authorise  a  step  is  not  the  person  who  can  carry  it out: 
such  a  step cannot  be  carried  out  when  it should  not  be, 
unless  both  persons  go  wrong. 
The  control  aspect  of  data  protection  is  mentioned 
explicitly  in  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  literature: 
An  organisation must  be  able  to  demonstrate  that  its 
system  complies  with  the  regulations  (Gl:p.96) 
"Data  subjects  should  be  able  to  verify  compliance  with 
these  principles"  (Ll:  section  21.09 ( 5)) 
The  Data  Inspection  Board  regulates  control  and 
security  (Sl:  section 6.9) 6.4  The  Inspection:  preparation 
6.4.0  Introduction 
For  convenience  of  treatment,  the  inspection  is  divided 
into  three  parts,  roughly  corresponding  to  before, 
during,  and  after  the  inspection visit. 
6.4.1  Initiation of  the  inspection 
It  is  the  commissioning  body  which  decides  that  a 
particular  inspection  must  take  place.  For  statutory 
inspections,  this  is  the  Authority,  and  the  rest  of  this 
section  relates particularly  to  such  inspections. 
There  are  several  reasons  which  may  trigger  off  an 
inspection: 
1.  As  part  of  a  procedure  for  licencing  systems 
containing  personal  data,  it may  be  necessary  to 
inspect  them  before  permitting  them  to  operate. 
Except  where  prima  facie  the  system  is  exceptionally 
dangerous  from  the  point  of  view  of  data protection, 
this  initial  inspection  would  normally  be  so· 
superficial  as  hardly  to  deserve  the  name,  consisting 
merely  of  vetting  of  particulars of  the  system 
supplied  by  the  data  user. 
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2.  Suspicion  of  a  breach  of  data protection  regulations, 
e.g.  as  evidenced  by  a  complaint  from  a  data  subject  • 
3.  Recognition  that  the  time  has  come  when  a  particular 
system  should  be  checked  for  compliance:  because  it 
is potentially dangerous,  or  because  a  previous 
inspection  (e.g.  for  licencing  purposes)  was  not 
sufficient  in  some  respect  • 
4.  As  a  follow-up  to  check  that  faults  revealed  by  a 
previous  inspection  have  been  corrected  • 
5.  Spot  checking  of  systems  to  encourage  compliance  with 
the  law,  to  give  general  reassurance,  or  to  provide 
information. 
6.4.2  Factors  conducive  to  inspection 
In  all  cases  except those  in  pursuit  of  a  major 
complaint,  the Authority will  have  some  descretion  over 
the  urgency  of  a  particular  statutory  inspection,  and 
even  whether  it need  take  place.  In  assigning  priorities 
to  different  inspections,  the  following  should  be 
considered: 
1.  The  sensitivity and  amount  of  personal  data  in  the 
system. 
2.  The  relationship of  the  data  user  and  the  data  subject  • 3.  The  motivation  to  abuse  of  the  system. 
4.  The  exposure  to  risk  of  the  system. 
5.  Public  apprehension  about  the  system  or  the  class  of 
similar  systems. 
6.  The  likelihood  of  the  system  having  changed  since  last 
inspected. 
7.  The  convenience  of  the  Authority. 
The  convenience  of  the  data  user  may  influence  when  but 
not  whether  a  statutory  inspection  occurs. 
Similar  factors  should  influence  the  decision  on 
voluntary  inspection,  but  the  convenience  of  the  data 
user  also  may  be  considered. 
It  is  likely that  the  total  size  of  the  statutory 
inspection  activity will  be  decided  by  the  Authority,  and 
that  this will  then  be  divided  under  headings  similar  to 
those  above.  Since  this  is  partly  a  political  issue,  the 
inspection  policy  and  general  programme  of  the  Authority 
should  be  exposed  for  public  discussion. 
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6.4.3  What  is  the  system? 
Sometimes  it will  be  difficult  to  define  what  is  to  be 
inspected.  This  will  not  be  the  case  for  a  spot  check  on 
a  system  whose  particulars  have  been  properly disclosed 
by  the  commissioning  body.  But  if  one  suspects  that 
there  is  a  hidden  system,  or  is  pursuing  a  complaint,  one 
may  be  uncertain  which  department  of  a  large  organisation 
should  be  inspected;  in  such  a  case  the  system  for 
inspection  purposes  might  have  to  be  defined  initially as 
the  whole  of  that organisation's personal  data  handling, 
and  the  inspector  would  have  the  task  of  seeing  if  the 
inspection  could  be  narrowed  down  to  small  parts  of  that 
system  • 
It  is desirable  that  the  system  which  is  to  be  inspected 
should  be  specified  precisely,  as  that will  clarify  the 
work  of  the  inspector  and  the  organisation;  but  absence 
of  such  a  specificat.ion  (e.g.  because  the  commissioning 
body  cannot  get  the  necessary  information)  must  not 
inhibit  an  inspection  which  is  judged  necessary. 
6. 4. 4 .  Charging  the  inspector 
The  commissioning  body,  having  decided  that  a  particular 
.inspection will  take  place,  will  appoint  the  inspector • In  choosing  the  inspector  (who,  it will  be  remembered 
from  6.1.8,  need  not  be  one  person)  the  commissioning 
body  will  to  consider  several  factors: 
1.  The  expected  amount  of  work  in  the  inspection. 
2.  Technical  aspects  of  the  system  which  require  special 
skills  in  the  inspector,  e.g.  a  particular  computer 
operating  system. 
3.  The  importance  of  the  inspection,  e.g.  public 
sensitivity,  or  significance  for  similar  systems. 
4.  The  abilities of  available  inspectors. 
5.  Plans  for  developing  inspectors'  abilities. 
6.  Other  forthcoming  inspections. 
In  appointing  the  inspector,  the  commissioning  body 
should  tell  him  any  opinions  it has  on  the  desirable 
thoroughness  of  the  inspection,  its  urgency  and  any  other 
matters  related  to  the  inspection.  The  inspector  should 
be  equipped  with  any  formal  evidence  he  may  need  of  the 
powers  he  has  (6.2.3). 
If  the  scope  of  the  inspection  is  not  the  same  as  the 
full  statutory  requirements,  its  scope  must  be  defined  in 
the  regulations  (6.1.5). 
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6.4.5  Timing  of  an  inspection 
It will  usually  be  more  inconvenient  and  costly  (at  least 
in effort)  for  both  the  inspector  and  the  data  user  if  an 
inspection  is  carried  out  at  short  notice.  Unless  there 
is  good  reason  for  urgency  (which  will  normally  only  be 
when  there  is  suspicion of  a  serious  breach  which  must  be 
stopped  quickly,  or  for  which  the  evidence  may  disa~pear 
if the  inspection  is  delayed) ,  the  inspection  should  take 
place  at  a  time  agreed  by  the  data  user • 
The  notice  given  to  the  data  user  will  give  him  time  to 
prepare  for  the  inspection,  which  will  usually  reduce  the 
time  taken  by  the  inspecto.r.  The  time  needed  for  this 
will  vary;  the  Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  (S2)  allows 
about  two  weeks • 
Notice  to  the  data  user  does  not  mean  notice  to  all staff 
connected  with  the  system:  it may  be  important  for  the 
inspector  to  see  them  in  normal  working  conditions • 
There  is  a  danger  that  the  data  user  might  use  the  notice 
time  to  improve  the  system  and  to  fabricate  or  destroy 
evidence,  thereby  possibly deceiving  the  inspector • 
Three  remarks  seem  in  order: 
1.  If  a  forthcoming  inspection  has  the  effect  of 
encouraging  the data  user  to  correct  his  system,  the 
inspection will  have  served  one  of  its purposes • 2.  To  the  extent  to  which  the  past  performance  of  the 
data  user  is  important,  any  opportunity  to  impair  the 
evidence  relating  to  it  is  undesirable. 
3.  The  inspection'procedure  must  not  be  unduly  influenced 
by  hasty  clean-ups  by  the  data  user  are  not  likely  to 
be  maintained:  for  example,  clear  desks  do  not  prove 
that printouts  are  never  left lying  about. 
6.4.6  Approach  to  the  organisation 
Unless,  for  reasons  discussed  in  the  previous  section 
(6.4.5),  the  data  user  is  not  to  be  warned  that  his 
system  is  to  be  inspected, ·the  inspector  will  contact  the 
data  user  before  the  visit.  The  following  matters  should 
be  discussed: 
1.  The  reason(s)  for  the  inspection 
2.  The  system  which  is  to  be  inspected,  including  any 
information  needed  to  specify  it  (6.4.3);  what  parts 
and  aspects  will  and  will  not  be  inspected. 
3.  The  expected  scale  of  the  inspection,  in  particular 
the  length  of  the  inspection visit  and  the  number  and 
identity of  people  forming  the  inspection  team. 
4.  The  powers  which  the  inspector  will  have.  What 
facilities  he  will  need:  working  accommodation, 
computing.  Conditions  and  methods  of  working. 
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5.  What  information  should  be  sent  to  the  inspector 
before  the  inspection visit  (6.5.1). 
6.  Which  people  in  the  organisation will  be  involved,  for 
what  purposes  and  to  what  extent;  which  parts  of  the 
organisation  may  be  visited;  whether  there  is  an 
internal  inspector  for  the  system;  what  documentation 
must  be  available  (6.5.14). 
7.  When  the  inspection visit  should  occur.  The  data  user 
or  his  substitute must  be  present  during  the visit. 
8.  Whether  or  not  the  data  user  will  be  shown  the 
inspection  report  in  draft  and  final  forms. 
The  sole  purpose  of  this discussion  is  to  expedite  the 
inspection visit  by  enabling  the  data  user  to  transfer 
information  to  the  inspector  in  a  manner  convenient  to 
both;  this will  reduce  the  length  of  the  vist  and 
therefore  the  cost  of  the  inspection.  If  the  inspector 
can  obtain  the  willing  co-operation  of  the  data  user,  the 
work  will  be  facilitated  (6.8.3) • 
In  the  case  of  a  statutory  inspection,  written  notice  of 
the  inspection  and  particulars of  the  inspection visit 
should  be  given  to  the  data  user,  and  he  should  be  given 
the  opportunity  to  find  out  what  his  legal  rights  are. 
Fig.  6.4.6-1  is  based  on  the  form  of  notice  used  by  the 
Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  (S2) • DATA INSPECTORATEDate:File No .•...•.•...•......••.•.••.....••.....•••...•••. 
Supervisory Department 
(Official's name. forename and grade) 
To: (name and address of the undertaking to be inspected) 
ADP INSPECTION AT (subject•s name and address) 
We hereby confirm the agreement reached in our telephone conversation of today with 
(name and title) that the Data Inspectorate will exercise its powers of supervision by means 
of  an inspection in accordance with  paras.  15-17 of  the Data Law  (289  of  1973)  at 
(undertaking's name and the address at which the inspection is to be carried out) on (date, 
time and duration). 
The Data Inspectorate will be represented by: 
(inspecting official's names) 
The inspection will cover: 
(state here the particular purpose(s) that will later be put into the 
report under the heading 'Purpose of the Inspection' or a summary of 
the relevant items in the model report. How detailed the description is 
to be will depend on the circumstances of the individual case). 
For and on behalf of the Data Inspectorate. 
signed (the official) 
.. ,. 
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6.5  The  inspection:  information gathering 
6.5.0  Introduction 
The  central part of  the  inspection consists  of  collecting 
information  to  show  the  extent  to  which  the  regulations 
are  being  complied  with.  This  information will  consist 
of  documents  obtained  from  the  data  user  and  the 
organisation,  answers  to  questions  put  by  the  inspector 
in  the  interviews  with  the  staff of  the  organisation,  and 
observations  by  the  inspector  of  parts  of  the  system  • 
In  the  following  sections 6.5.1  to  .14  questions  to  which 
the  inspector  must  find  answers  are  distributed  under 
various  headings,  mostly  corresponding  to  stages  in  which 
the  system  treats  the  data.  This  will  not  usually  be  the 
order  in  which  it  is  most  convenient  to  gather  the 
information,  which  will  depend  on  several  circumstances, 
especially  the  way  in  which  the  system  is  organised.  The 
inspector  must  use  his  judgement  as  to  which  of  the 
listed questions  need  answering,  bearing  in  mind  the 
nature  of  the  system,  the  regulations  and  the  desired 
throughness  of  the  inspection  (6.2.6) • 
6-fl 6.5.1  Preliminary  information 
It will  be  more  convenient  for  both  the  inspector  and  the 
data  user  if  as  much  as  possible  of  the  necessary 
information  is  obtaiAed  outside  of  the  inspection visit. 
The  informaion  which  is particularly  suitable  to  obtain 
beforehand  is  this: 
1.  Legal  documentation,  e.g.  data  protection  licence, 
previous  inspection  documentation. 
2.  The  organisation;  the general  nature  of  its business, 
its size,  management  structure,  any  data  protection 
policies. 
3.  Particulars of  the  system  as  in  the  staturoty 
declaration  (6.3.1.1). 
4.  The  system within  the  organisation;  its  importance, 
its management  structure. 
5.  The  parts of  the  system;  where  they  are,  what  they 
are,  how  they  fit  together,  who  is  responsible  for 
each part,  who  can  give  information  about  each  part; 
outline  system  documentation. 
When  he  has  analysed  this  information,  the  inspector 
should  make  an  initial decision  on  the  thoroughness  of 
the  inspection,  and  the  parts  of  the  system  which  he  must 
inspect  more  throughly,  so  that  he  will  be  in  a  better 
position  to  plan  the details of  the  inspection visit. 
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6.5.2  Personnel 
As  discussed  in 6.3.5,  the  people  involved  in  the  system 
(including  in principle  the  management  of  the 
organisation  up  to  the  highest  level)  are  the  most 
important  single part  of  the  system  from  the  point  of 
view  of data protection,  and  therefore  the  inspector  must 
form  an  opinion  on  them.  The  following  questions  should 
be  considered: 
- is  there  evidence  that  the  highest  level  of 
management  is  aware  of  the  legal  and  social 
significance  of  data protection,  and  of  the  need  to 
organise  to  achieve  it? 
- does  the  organisation  have  a  declared  policy  on  data 
protection? 
- is  there  a  single person  responsible  for  data 
protection  throughout  the  organisation?  does  he  have 
adequate  resources?  is  he  isolated  from  pressures  to 
compromise  data protection objectives? 
- within  the  system,  are  there  clearly defined 
responsibilities  for  all  matters  which  relate  to data 
protection? 
- in  the  selection of  personnel  to  work  within  the 
system,  is  weight  given  to  the  qualities  which 
contribute  to  data protection,  e.g.  ability  to 
respect  confidences? 
6-r3 - are  personnel  within  the  system  made  aware  of  data 
protection  responsibilities: 
- by  initial .training? 
- by  notices? 
- by  informal  encouragement? 
- by  periodic  training? 
- do  working  conditions  generally  support  data 
protection objectives  (this will  be  borne  in  mind 
throughout  the  following  sections)? 
6.5.3  Notifications 
This  section  is  concerned  with  checking  that  the  data 
user  complies  with  the  regulations  with  respect  to  giving 
information  of  various  types  (and  in  one  case,  money)  to 
various  people. 
1.  To  the Authority 
- Is  a  declaration of  the  system  sent  to  the 
Authority? 
- Has  the  Authority  received  this declaration? 
- Are  all  the  required  particulars present? 
- Do  the  particulars correspond  to  the  actual  present 
system? 
- Has  the  registration  fee  been  paid  to  the 
Authority? 
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2.  To  the  public 
- Is  the  system disclosed  publicly  and  by  what  media? 
- Is  the  spread  of disclosure  adequate? 
- Are  all the  required  particulars disclosed? 
- Are  any  particulars disclosed  which  should  not  be? 
- Do  the particulars correspond  to  the  actual  present 
system? 
- Are  the particulars as  disclosed  intelligible  to 
those  to  whom  they  are  directed? 
- How  are  general  queries  about  the  system dealt 
with? 
- Can  the  public  easily  find  out  whether  or  not  they 
are  data  subjects  of  the  system? 
3.  To  the  data  subject 
- Is  the  system disclosed  to  all  the  data  subjects? 
- By  what  means? 
- Before  entry  to  the  system? 
- On  entry  to  the  system? 
- When  data  is  collected  from  the  data  subject? 
- Regularly? 
- On  demand  by  the  data  subject? 
- Do  the  methods  of  disclosure  work  well  (  the 
inspector  should  consider  whether  to  st-imulate  or 
simulate  demands  by  data  subjects)? 
-How  are  demands  (by  letter,  by  phone,  in  person) 
dealt  with? 
- Do  subjects  know?  ask  a  sample 
6-.rr - Are  all  the  required particulars disclosed? 
- Do  the  particulars  correspond  to  the  actual  present 
system? 
- Are  the particulars  as  disclosed  intelligible  to  the 
data  subjects? 
A  similar  set of questions  applies  to  disclosure  to  the 
data  subject  of  the  content  of  his  record,  with  these 
additions: 
- What  checks  are  made  against  impersonation  of  a  data 
subject? 
- What  checks  are  made  against  a  record  being  sent  to 
a  wrong  address? 
- Are  any  charges  made  for  this disclosure 
legitimate? 
- Is  the  data  user  informed  of  his  rights  to  challenge 
the  correctness  of  his  record? 
- How  does  a  data  user  respond  to  such  challenges  by 
the  data  subject? 
- Are  corrections  accepted? 
- Are  disagreements  resolved  satisfactorily? 
- Is  the  data  subject  given  a  copy  of  his  record  after 
correction? 
With  regard  to  informing  the  data  subject  when  data 
refering  to  him  is  passed  out  of  the  system  for  legal 
purposes: 
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- Is  there  a  record  of  such  occurrences? 
- Is  the  data  subject  correctly  informed? 
6.5.4  Data  capture 
This  heading  covers  all activities relating  to  the  entry 
of  data  into  the  system.  It  is  concerned  to  ensure  that 
the  process  of  gathering data  is  fair,  reliable, 
confidential,  and  that  any  opportunities  that  it offers 
for  informing  the data  subject  are  used • 
The  following  questions  should  be  answered: 
- What  sources  of  data  are  used? 
- Can  their  accuracy  be  relied  upon? 
- Are  duplicate  or  alternative  sources  available? 
- Is  unecessary duplication  of  data  collection  avoided 
(e.g.  could  data  from  different parts  of  the  system 
or  from  other  systems  be  used)? 
- Is  any  source  of  data  subject  to  other  regulations, 
e.g.  because  it comes  from  abroad? 
- Are  the  people  who  collect  the  data  careful  about 
accuracy? 
- Are  the  people  who  collect  the  data  careful  about 
confidentiality? - Are  the  input data  forms: 
- Easy  to  understand? 
- Easy  to  fill  in  correctly? 
- Serially  numbered  for  control  purposes? 
- Suitably marke.d  to  indicate confidentiality? 
- Limited  to  the  permitted  data? 
- Do  any  documents  or  human  contacts  with  the  data 
subject: 
- Declare  to  him  the particulars of  the  system 
(6.3.1.1)? 
Tell  him  whether  he  is  legally obliged  to  give 
information,  or  the  consequences  of  his  not 
giving  it? 
- Ask,  or  imply,  his  consent  for  the  data  to  be 
used  in  some  way 
- Is  improper  pressure  applied  to  the  data  subject  (or 
any  data  supplier)  to  give  data? 
- Is  the  correction procedure  error-prone  or  insecure 
in  some  way? 
- Does  the  data  subject  receive  a  copy  of  the  input 
data  form? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
6.5.5  Data  entry 
This  heading  covers all activities  involving personal 
data after  it has  first  been  captured  (e.g.  on 
application  forms)  until it has  been  made  fully available 
for  use  (e.g.  has  been  key  punched  onto  a  computer  disc) . 
During  this  stage,  the  main  dangers  are  that  errors  may 
creep  into  the  data,  and  that  confidentiality may  be 
breached.  The  inspector  should  consider  the  following 
questions: 
- Is  the data during  transmission  into  the  system 
safe: 
- Against  loss  (e.g.  are  the  documents  serially 
numbered,  and  their  movements  logged)? 
- Against  disclosure? 
- Against  corruption,  e.g.  by  mis-keying? 
- Are  punching  documents  stored  securely when  not  in 
use? 
- Are  data  preparat-ion  staff  aware  of  the  need  for 
confidentiality? 
- Can  outsiders easily get  access  to  the  input 
documents? 
- What  checks  on  the  accuracy  of  the  data  entry  are 
made? 
- What  happens  to  the  input  documents  after  data 
entry? 
6-- r~ 6.5.6  Checking  the data quality 
This  section  is  concerned  with  checking  that  the  types  of 
data  in  the  system  are  permissible,  and  that  their  values 
are  correct.  The  inspector  checks  all data  storage 
media,  and  should  answer  the  following  questions  with 
regard  to  the  totality of  data  on  these  media.  If  a 
system  has  distinct parts  such  that  it  is  inappropriate 
to  lump  all the  data  together  in  this  way  e.g.  because 
the  flow  of  data  between  the  parts  has  data  protection 
implications  which  require  control),  the  inspector  has  to 
treat  each  part  of  the  system  to  some  extent  separately. 
- What  types  of data  are  actually  stored? 
- Do  these  types  correspond  to  what  is declared? 
- Do  these  types  correspond  to  what  is  authorised? 
- Why  is  each  type  of  data  needed  by  the  system? 
- How  is  each  type  of  data  used  in  the  purposes  of  the 
system? 
- Would  extra  types  of data  improve  the  quality  from 
the  data  subject's viewpoint? 
- How  are  requests  for  inclusion  of  each  new  type  of 
data  authorised? 
- What  steps  are  taken  to  ensure  that  the  data  is: 
- Accurate 
- Up  to  dat·e 
- Not  misleading 
- Complete 
- Is  the  data  actually: 
- Accurate 
- Up  to  data 
- Not  misleading 
- Complete 
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- How  many  external  (e.g.  from  a  data  subject) 
corrections  are  received? 
- Are  they  effectively processed,  included  in  backup 
copies? 
- How  are  disagreements  over  the  values  to  be  recorded 
resolved? 
- Are  there  any  procedures  for  propagating  corrections 
to  those  who  have  received  incorrect data? 
- What  procedures  are  there  for  deleting data  when  it 
is  no  longer  needed? 
- Do  they  work? 
6.5.7  Restricted  access 
The  requirements  of  restricted  access  appl~.to data  in 
all  the  forms  which  it may  take  within  the  system, 
including  human-readable  hard  copy,  computer  storage  of 
all  types,  data  in  transmission  (e.g.  by  cable),  and  even 
the  human  mind.  These  are  so  pervasive  that  it  is 
simpler  for  the  inspector  to  check  accesses  to  all parts 
of  the  system,  rather  than  just  to  the  data  which  is  the 
prime  concern  of  the  regulations.  Indeed,  the  West 
German  Federal  Data Protection Act  (Dl:  annex  to  section 
6(1))  explicitly requires  controls  of  admission,  leakage, 
memory,  user,  data  access,  communication,  input, 
processing  on  behalf  of  third  parties,  and  transport  (as 
well  as  organisation control,  which  is  covered  here  in 
6.5.2)  6-6( The  inspector  is therefore  challenged  to  check  that  there 
is  no  access  to  any  part  of  the  system  (accommodation, 
hardware,  program,  data  storage  media,  papers,  human 
beings)  except  that  which  is permitted,  and  that  the 
nature  of  each  access  is  as  permitted  (e.g.  that  a  person 
permitted  to  access  a  file  for  one  data  subject's  record 
does  not  browse  through  the  file  out  of  curiosity).  In 
considering  the  following  questions,  the  inspector  may 
therefore  wish  to  concentrate  on  the  main  issue,  viz.  can 
anyone  read  data  which  he  should  not? 
- Is  physical  access  to  the  accomodation  in  which  the 
system  is  located  confined  to  those  who  need  it? 
- Within  the  system,  is access  to  each  part  confined  to 
those  who  need  it? 
- In  what  media  is data  stored? 
- What  procedures  exist  for  determining  who  should  have 
access  to  the  data  in  each  of  its  forms? 
- Do  these  procedures  correspond  to  the  accesses 
required  by  the  declared  purposes  of  the  system? 
- Are  they  effectively administered? 
What  precautions  are  there  against  improper  access  by 
authorised  persons  (e.g.  browsing)? 
- Are  there  any  undisclosed  data  files? 
The  above  questions  apply  to  many  parts  of  the  system. 
The  following  are  examples  of  questions  related  to 
specific  parts  in  the  computer  area  (for  a  more  nearly 
exhaustive  set  of  check  points,  see  ref.  Wl)  : 
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- Are  computer  terminals  housed  in  secure  locations? 
- Is  access  to  computer  terminals  confined  to 
authorised  personnel? 
- Is  there  a  computer  log  recording  all  input  files 
accessed  and  the  pesons  and  programs  which  accessed 
them? 
- Does  the  computer  log  record  all output  files  which 
are  produced? 
- Is  oversight  of  sensitive  information  prevented,  e.g. 
by  placing  a  VDU  so  that  the  person  using  it has  a 
blank  wall  behind  him? 
- Is  there  a  media  librarian who  enforces  physical 
controls  on  the  media  library? 
- Is  there  an  effecive  computer  password  system  which 
confines  use  of  computing  facilities  to  authorised 
personnel? 
- Does  the  computer  operating  system provide  effective 
lock-outs  of data,  both  in  the  main  store  and  in 
backing  store? 
- During  program  development,  is  care  taken  that  tests 
are  not  run  on  sensitive data? 
- For  transmission  between  remote  stations,  and 
storage,  is  encryption  used? 
- Are  print-outs containing  sensitive data  removed 
promptly  and  kept  from  places  where  they  can  be  read 
by  unauthorised  personnel? 
- Is  photocopying  of  such  printouts  prevented? 
- Where  possible,  is data partitioned,  so  that  users 
cannot  access  parts  of  the  file  which  they  do  not 
need? 6.5.8  Data  update 
This  heading  covers  the  requirement  of  ensuring  that  the 
personal  data  which  is  held  within  the  system  is  kept  up-
to-date,  including  any  correction  and  rearrangement  of 
the  data.  As  explained  in 6.3.2,  the  required  degree  of 
up-to-dateness  is  that  which  will  avoid  the  data 
processes  producing  wrong  results,  and  will  therefore  be 
different·for  different data  items.  In  many  cases  there 
will  be  some  element  of  judgement  involved.  With  this  in 
mind,  the  inspector  should  ask  the  following  questions: 
- How  up-to-date  should  each  data  item  be? 
- Does  the  data  user  have  an  idea  of  the  up-to-dateness 
required?  how  does  it  compare  with  the  inspector's 
opinion? 
- What  measures  are  prescribed  to  keep  the  data  up-to-
date? 
- Are  these  measures  carried out? 
- Is  the  data  in  fact  up-to-date? 
- Is  the  updating  applied  to  any  back-up  copies  of  the 
data  which  are  kept? 
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6.5.9  Data  use 
This  heading  covers all processes,  including  human 
operations,  by  which  the  data  is  manipulated  to  satisfy 
the  purposes  of  the  system.  It would  include  such 
actions  as  payroll  calculation,  a  search  through  police 
intelligence files,  the  maintenance  of  a  hospital 
administration  system.  The  main  interests of  the 
inspector  under  this  heading  are  that  only  duly 
authorised  processes  occur,  that  they  are  correctly 
carried out,  and  that  the  processing  does  not  expose  the 
data  to  improper  access.  He  should  ask  these  questions: 
- What  are  the  declared  purposes  of  the  system? 
- What  are  the  actual  uses  of  the  system? 
-What  is the  procedure  for  authorising  processing  of 
data? 
- Is  it appropriate,  considering  the  nature  of  the 
data? 
- Is  it correctly observed? 
- What  processes  are  carried out? 
- Are  they  suitably  authorised? 
- Are  they  necessary  and  legitimate? 
- What  checks  are  there  that  no  other  processes  are 
carried out? 
- Do  the  processes  treat  ambiguous  or  unreliable  data 
appropriately? 
- Is  the  logic  of  the  programming  fair,  especially  to 
the  data  subject? 
- How  is  the  programming  done? 
6-6) - Is  it adequately  checked? 
- Is  the  programming  correct? 
- Are  the  systems  programs  checked? 
- Do  the  programs  include  checks  against: 
- data  error 
- programming  error 
- operator  error 
- machine  error? 
- How  are  the  programs  protected  against  accidental 
corruption? 
- How  are  the  progams  protected  against  deliberate 
corruption? 
- How  are  amendments  to  the  programs: 
- initiated 
- checked 
- authorised 
- implemented? 
- Are  the  (computer)  operations  correctly  executed? 
- Are  any  interests  of  the  data  subjects  with  respect 
to  the  reliability of  the  processing  (e.g.  in  the 
event  of partial  failure  of  the  system)  protected? 
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6.5.10  Data  interrelation 
This  heading  refers  to  the possibility of  data  from 
different  systems  being  brought  together  to  give  what  is 
felt  to  be  a  qualitatively different  collection of  data. 
Although  this  is  logically  covered  by  the  headings  of 
data  capture  (6.5.4)  as  regards  data  coming  into  the 
system  which  is  being  inspected,  and  data  dissemination 
(6.5.11)  as  regards  data  going  out  of  the  system,  the 
public  concern  which  is  associated  with  such  activities 
requires  the  inspector  to  take  special  care  to  examine 
them.  The  following  questions  should  be  considered: 
- From  what  other  systems  does  data  enter  the  inspected 
system? 
- What  data  enters  from  these  systems? 
- To  what  other  systems  does  data  pass  from  the 
inspected  system? 
- What  data  passes  to  these  systems? 
- Are  these  transfers: 
- authorised  suitably? 
- declared  suitably? 
6.5.11  Data  dissemination 
This  heading  covers  all personal  data  which  leaves  the 
system deliberately  (i.e.  by  the  decision  of  the  data 
user),  whether  in  machine-readable  or  human-readable 
6-67  • form;  but  notifications  to  the  data  subjects  are  covered 
in  6.5·.3.  The  requirement  is  that  such  data  should  not 
cause  improper  disclosure.  The  inspector  should  find 
answers  to  these  questions: 
- What  data  leaves  the  system? 
- Is  this  dissemination  a  part  of  the  declared  purpose 
of  the  system? 
- If  not,  is  it suitably authorised  or  otherwise 
permissible? 
- Is  its reciept declared  by  the  recipient? 
- Is  the  method  of  transmission  secure  against 
corruption  and  unauthorised  access? 
- In  particular,  are  human-readable  documents  suitably 
protected  against  unauthorised  reading? 
- Are  checks  made  that  persons  cannot  be  inadvertently 
identified,  e.g.  in  statistical tables  (6.3.4)? 
6.5.12  Data  archival 
In  many  systems  there  are  arrangements  for  segregating 
data  so  that  it  is  not  ordinarily  avilable  for 
processing,  but  can  for  special  purposes  be  accessed  by 
special  means.  This  segregation  of  data  is  what  is  here 
referred  to  as  archival.  Data  is  usually  archived  when 
it  is  no  longer  expected  to  be  frequently  used,  but 
should  not  be  erased  because  it might  be  needed.  This 
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archiving  is desirable  in  the  name  of  data protection,  as 
it prevents  the  data  being  readily  accessed,  so  the 
inspector  should  see  that  archiving  is  used  whenever 
possible,  and  that  the  data  is  adequately  protected: 
- What  arrangements  are  there  for  archiving  data? 
- Are  they  used  as  much  as  they  should  be? 
- Do  they  work  properly? 
- Is  archived  data  kept  securely? 
- What  are  the  arrangements  for  retrieving  archived 
data? 
- Is  archived  data  kept  securely  against  unauthorised 
access? 
What  interest has  the  data  subject  in  archived  data? 
- Is  archived  data  erased  when  it  is  no  longer  needed? 
6.5.13  Data  erasure 
The  term  'erasure'  is  used  here  in  its  normal  sense  as 
referring  to  the  process  which  puts  data  so  that  it  is 
impossible  ever  to  read  it.  This  is  the  last  thing  that 
can  happen  to  data,  and  it  is  sometimes  considered  the 
ultimate  in data protection.  But  the  interests  of  the 
data  subject  and  society  at  large will  often  require  that 
data  should  be  retained  longer  than  the  interests of  the 
data  user  would  require;  e.g.  as  a  legal  requirement,  or for  the purposes  of  scientific or  historical  research. 
The  inspector  must  therefore  check  that data  erasure 
takes  place  at  the  right  time,  and  is  carried  out 
effectively: 
- Who  decides  when  each  item of  data  is  to  be  erased? 
- Are  these  decisions  suitable,  bearing  in  mind 
particularly the  subjects'  interests? 
- What  are  the  procedures  for  erasing  data  in  all  its 
forms: 
- human-readable  paper? 
- punch  cards? 
- paper  tape? 
- magnetic  tape? 
- magnetic  disk? 
- How  are  they  carried  out? 
- Are  they  duly  carried  out? 
- Are  they  effective,  e.g.  no  residual  images  on 
magnetic  tape  or  disc? 
- Are  documents  and  carbon  papers  shredded? 
- Are  there  any  plans  for  disposal  of  the  data  in 
event  of  termination  of  the  whole  system? 
Are  there  any  threats  to  the  subject  in  improper 
(accidental,  malicious)  erasure? 
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6.5.14  Control 
As  discussed  in  6.3.6,  control  is  a  vital aspect  of  the 
organisation's data protection  work.  As  such,  it applies 
to all the  other  items  which  are  inspected,  and  should  be 
borne  in  mind  by  the  inspector  throughout  his  gathering 
of  information.  The  following  factors  should  be 
considered: 
1.  Documentation.  This  should  describe  the  system  so 
that  there  is  no  doubt  what  should  happen  in  each 
e  part  of  the  system  at  each  stage of  the  processing  of 
the  data.  It  should  be  correct,  which  requires  that 
there  must  be  a  means  for  keeping  it up-to-date . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
2.  Logging.  There  are  many  events  occuring  within  the 
system,  and  a  perfect  log  would  make  it possible  to 
find  out  what  has  happened  in  the  past,  and  what  the 
current  situation  is  on  any  particular,  so  that  in 
principle  one  could  have  a  complete  action  reply. 
The  inspector  should  check  that  complete  and  accurate 
logs  are  kept  of  all  signific~nt routine  events,  e.g. 
receipt  of  batches  of  personal  data,  computer  runs, 
mail  outs,  and  of  all significant  occasional  events, 
e.g.  enquiries  from  data  subjects,  computer 
breakdowns,  personnel  changes.  It  is  technically 
feasible  for  a  computer  to  log  all  the  accesses  which 
are  made  to  files  of  data,  and  this is  considered  a 
powerful  aid  to  data protection  (Gl:pp.49-53,  144-5) • 3.  Error  detection  and  correction.  An  error  is  any 
occurrence  in  the  system  which  is  not  intended  by 
those  who  specify it;  the  word  is  used  here  to 
include  deliberate  interventions  (e.g.  for  private 
gain)  as  well  as  accidents.  It  is  inevitable  that 
errors will  occur,  and  therefore  there  must  be  means 
to  correct  them.  The  particular  means  will  depend  on 
the  process  in  question.  for  example,  key-punching 
from  input  documents  may  be  checked  by  being  repeated 
by  the  same  (or  preferably  a  different)  operator. 
Streams  of  numbers  can  sometimes  be  checked  by  seeing 
if their  total  is correct.  Discrete  electronic 
transmissions will  usually  have  checkbits  which  in 
some  cases  permit  automatic  correction  of  errors. 
The  inspector  should  find  out  whether  at  all 
important  stages  where  errors  may  occur  there  exist 
suitable means  for  detecting  and  correcting  them. 
4.  Separation  of  duties.  A potent  device  for  reducing 
the  risks arising  from  human  fallibility  is  the 
practice  of  arranging  that  at  least  two  persons  are 
needed  before  certain actions  can  be  taken.  In  some 
cases  the  roles  of  the  two  persons  are  equivalent 
(e.g.  holding  two  keys  to  unlock  a  store  of  sensitive 
data);  in  others  one  person  is  needed  to  authorise 
the  action  before  the  other  takes  it. 
5.  Internal  inspection.  The  inspection procedure  which 
is described  in  this  section  6  is  intended  to  be 
adaptable  for  use  by  an  organisation  on  its own 
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systems  (6.2.4).  Some  organisations  could  justify 
maintaining  their  own  inspection  departments 
continuously monitoring  data  protection  in  all parts 
of  the  organisation.  If  such  an  activity exists,  it 
is likely that  the  level  of  compliance  for  the 
regulations will  be  high,  or  if  not  high  at  least  it 
will  be  known,  and  that  the  work  of  the  external 
inspector  will  be  lightened;  but  it does  not  excuse 
the  external  inspector  from  earring  out  his  own 
checks  independently  . 
The  following  qu,estions  summarise  the  issues  which  the 
inspector  should  keep  in  mind  under  the  heading  of 
control: 
- What  documentation  of  the  system  exists? 
- Is  it complete? 
- Is  it clear? 
- Does  it agree  with  the  system  that  exists? 
- What  mechanism  is  there  for  keeping  it up-to-date? 
- What  logs  are  kept  of  routine  events? 
- What  logs  are  kept  of  occasional  events? 
- Do  they  give  adequate  records  of  what  has  happened? 
- Do  they  make  it possible  to  determine  what  the 
current  situation  is? 
- What  means  of  detecting  errors  are  there? 
- How  are  detected errors dealt with? 
- At  important  points  in  the  system,  is  the  principle 
of  separation of  duties  applied? 
- Is  there  an  effective  internal  inspection  activity? 
6-73 6.6  The  inspection:  conclusion 
6.6.0  Introduction 
When  the  inspector  has  gathered  all  the  information  which 
he  needs,  his  remaining  duty  is  to  produce  the  inspection 
report.  The  means  of  presenting  this  is  discussed  in 
6.6.1,  and  its contents  in 6.6.2.  When  it has  received 
the  inspection  report,  the  commissioning  body  must  decide 
if  any  further  action  is  required  (6.6.3).  The  inspector 
may  report  to  the  commissi-oning  body  further  information 
which  is  not  in  the  inspection  report  (6.6.4).  At  the 
end  of  the  inspection,  the  materials which  have  been 
fathered  by  the  inspector  must  be  disposed  of 
satisfactorily  (6.6.5). 
6.6.1  Presentation  of  the  inspection  report 
The  formalities  of  the  inspection  report  are  these: 
since  the  inspector  is  appointed  by  the  commissioning 
body,  it  is  to  that  body  which  he  presents  his  report, 
and  it then  belongs  entirely  to  that' body.  The  report  is 
concerned  only with  meeting  the  purposes  of  the 
inspection.  But  this will  never  be  the  whole  story: 
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1.  The  inspector  would  be  wise  to  discuss  his  report  in 
draft  form  with  the  commissioning  body,  to  check  that 
it meets  the  objectives  of  that  body  and  if  necessary 
to  make  improvements • 
2.  The  inspector  should  send  a  copy  of  his  report  in 
draft  form  to  the  data  user  (unless,  as  discussed  in 
6.8.5,  there  are  compelling  reasons  against  this 
action),  and,  if appropriate,  react  to  his  comments. 
3.  The  commissioning  body  will  usually  send  a  copy  of  the 
final  report  to  the  data  user  (6.6.3). 
4.  There  will  be  much  useful  information  which  the 
inspector  should  consider  passing  on  to  the 
commissioning  body  less  formally  (6.6.4) • 
6.6.2  Inspection  report  - contents 
The  formal  result  of  an  inspection  is  a  report  which  the 
inspector  send  to  the  commissioning  body.  To  meet  the 
essential objectives  of  inspection  (6.0.2),  it must contain sufficient detail of  all discovered  actual  or 
potential  breaches  (6.2.1)  of  the  regulations,  so  that 
the  commissioning  body  can  decide  what  should  be  done; 
or,  if  there  are  nod  discovered  breaches,  it must  say  so. 
The  following  should  be  in  the  inspection  report: 
1.  Identity of  the  system  which  is  inspected:  its  name, 
address,  the  organisation,  the  data  user,  any  legal 
registration particulars;  the  time  (point  or  period) 
to  which  the  inspection applies. 
2.  Purpose  of  the  inspection,  its  scope  and  a  description 
of  the  regulations  on  which  the  inspection  is  based. 
3.  Name  of  the  inspector. 
4.  Particulars of  the  inspection visit:  time,  places, 
people  interviewed. 
5.  Any  necessary general  information  about  the  system;  if 
the  purpose  of  the  inspection  is  to  provide 
information  to  the Authority  (e.g.  to  enable  it to 
oversee  personal  data  applications generally),  this 
may  be  a  substantial  section. 
6.  Particulars of  any  discovered  actual  or  potential 
breaches,  or  if there  are  none,  a  statement  to  that 
effect.  If  the  system  ha~  been  registered  as  req~ired 
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by  the  regulations,  this will  be  stated  here.  This 
section which  for  statutory  inspections  is  normally 
the  essential  core  of  the  report,  may  actually  be  a 
small,  or  even  almost  empty,  part  • 
7.  Other  remarks  about  the  system which,  though  not 
formally  necessary,  could  contribute  to  good  personal 
data practice.  Reference  could  be  made  to  problems 
(and  perhaps  solutions)  which  might  be  relevant  to 
other  systems,  and  be  of  interest  to  computer 
manufacturers,  etc.  It may  be  convenient  to  present 
this  as  a  review  of  the  whole  system,  perhaps 
structured  in  a  similar  way  to  the  inspection visit 
(6.5),  commenting  on  its strength  as  well  as  its 
weaknesses,  and  recommending  methods  of  improvement. 
For  voluntary  inspections,  this will  normally  be  the 
most  important part  • 
8.  Particulars of  any. intended  follow  up  action,  e.g.  a 
further  inspection  to  check  whether  necessary 
improvements  to  the  system  have  been  made. 
A  translation of  a  model  for  the  inspection  report  which 
is  used  by  the  Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  (S2),  is 
shown  in  the  figure  below • 
6-77 DATA INSPECTION BOARD 
Supervisory Department 
REPORT 
(date of inspection) 
Inspection of ADP/Register of Persons at (the authority of firms address) 
lnapection Officials. Names and forenames of the representatives of the Data Inspection Board. 
Representing (the authority or fum). The authority or firm's representatives durinq the inspection: names 
and forenames and, if relevant, their positions. 
Time. For example, 9-12 noon, but also the date if the inspection extends over more than one day. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Purpose of the inspection. The heading is to be used if required where the purpose of the inspection must  e 
be given in more detail than is shown in the headinqs given in the report. 
Organization and its busineu. The authority, organization, company, management and owners. 
Business: internal, external 
Installation: development, operation. 
Own register of persons 
Own register (or list) 
Check of authorization 
Secrecy declarations or other sensitive registers or information. 
Work carried out for other organizations 
Customers' registers or per~ons (or lists) 
Obligations according to the agreement with the person(s) responsible for the register 
Powers of attorney 
Information to the customers regarding the Data Act. 
Check of Authorization 
Compliance with conditions as in Sections 5, 6 and 18 
Routine amending as in Sections 8 and 9 
Routine reporting as in section 10 
Other relevant measures 
Layout and premises 
Computers, terminals (number, type, performance and distribution) 
Data communication 
Condition of the premises. 
Security of Data 
Security organization; instructions 
Secrecy pledge as per section 13 
Check of authority in batches/real time 
Handling procedures; system documentation 
Operating plan, shift rota, etc. control of access, visitors' book 
Reconstruction 
. Data media: receipt, issue, preparation,  follow~  up tape library 
·Weeding, cancellation of magnetic tape/transcription. 
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Data quality 
Data acquisition 
Coding 
Data recording 
Processing 
Outgoing data 
Inspection of the Register 
Register transcription, outgoing data; check of authorization  . 
There is nothing further to be added to the report. 
Signature of the Official 6.6.3  Subsequent  actions  by  the  commissioning  body 
The  commissioning  body  will  normally  send  a  copy  of  the 
inspection  report  to  the  data  user  (6.8.5},  with  a 
covering  letter. 
The  commissioning  body  must  review  the  inspection  report. 
If  it decides  that  no  action  is  required  by  the  data 
user,  it should  tell  him  of  this decision,  and  tell  the 
inspector  to  dispose  of  his  inspection materials  (6.6.5}. 
The  commissioning  body  may  decide  that  actions  are  needed 
with  respect  to  the  system: 
1.  It may  order  the  data  user  to  make  changes  to  the 
system  in  specified  ways  (even  to  the  extent  of 
stopping  its operations  temporarily  or  indefinitely}. 
2.  It may  suggest  to  the  data  user  that--changes  are  ~ade 
to  the  system. 
3.  It may  give  notice  of  its  intention  to  re-inspect 
after  a  stated  time  interval. 
4.  In  the  case  of  a  statutory  inspection,  it may  initiate 
prosecution  of  the  data  user. 
The  next  page  is  a  translation of  a  model  of  a  letter 
which  may  -be  sent  by  the  Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  to 
a  computer  bureau  following  an  inspection  which  revealed 
deficiencies  in  the  system. 
• 
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DATA INSPECnON BOARD Date: File No ••..•.•..•.•••..•...•••••...•••••••••.•..••••..•.......... 
Supervisor Department 
(Official's name, forename and grade) 
To: 
(The name and addreu of the subject 
of the inspection) 
e  ADP INSPECnON OF (tbe name and address of the subject of the inspection) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Herewith a copy of the report on the inspection of your undertaking carried out on 28 February 1978. 
Under the provisions of section 18 of the Data Act, the Data Inspection Board may, as a consequence of what 
emerges from  the inspection of  a  computer centre, amend the conditions previously laid down in the 
Certificate of Authority to establish and operate a  register of persons, or may issue new directions in the 
respects stated in section 5 or section 6 of the Data Act. By law, such directions must be addressed to the 
person(s) responsible for the register, for example, a service agency's clients/customers, who maintain a 
register of persons with the service agency. 
Following the inspection carried out at your premises, the Data Inspection Board is considering issuing 
directions in the following respects: 
(Description of  deficiencies noted; person(s) responsible for the register and the register for 
which the new directions are being considered). 
As a step in the handling of this matter, the Data Inspection Board provides you with an opportunity to make 
any comments you may wish to make on the inspection report and the deficiencies mentioned in it by not 
later than  ...  197  .... 
Your comments should show whether, and if so by what date at the latest, you intend to take any steps to 
correct the deficiencies.  Your comments must include a  statement of  what the proposed measures will 
consist of. 
For and on behalf of the Data Inspection Board  . 
(Signature: The  statutory  inspection  should  give  sufficient 
information  for  the  Authority  to  make  a  sound  decision 
within  its responsibilities  (e.g.  whether  to  prosecute 
the  data  user  for  breach .of  the  regulations),  but  not 
with  the other  factors  which  would  influence  such  a 
decision.  It  is  important  that  an  inspection  which  may 
be  the  basis of  legal  proceedings  should  produce  evidence 
that  is  strong  enough  to  withstand  forensic  handling. 
6.6.4  The  inspector's other  findings 
Apart  from  the  esential  hard  facts  which  form  the  main 
contents  of  the  inspection  report,  or  are  their  basis, 
the  inspector  may  gather  a  great deal  of  additional 
useful  further  information,  including: 
1.  The  inspector's  impressions  of  the  system,  the  data 
user  and  the  organisation with  respect  to  data 
protection. 
2.  Experiences  during  the  inspection  which  may  be 
relevant  to  future  inspections,  e.g.  testing  methods 
which  work  well  or  badly,  unexpected  problems  and 
unusual  solutions,  undesirable  pressures  on  the 
inspector  (6. 7. 5)  • 
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3.  Insights which  should  influence  future  policy  towards 
inspection  of  the  system  or  others  like  it  • 
Such  information  is cumulatively of  great value,  and 
should  not  be  discarded  because  it may  be  controversial, 
subjective  or  difficult to  present.  For  example,  the 
Authority  needs  it to  carry  out  an  effective  inspection 
programme.  The  inspector  should  therefore  find  means  of 
passing  this  information  to  the  commissioning  body.  The 
question  of  the  breaching  confidences  of  the  data  user  is 
considered  in 6.7.8  • 
The  commissioning  body  must  decide  whether  this 
information  should  be  disclosed  (e.g.  to  the  data  user) • 
6.6.5  Disposal  of  inspection materials 
When  the  inspection  is  complete  (i.e.  when  the 
commissioning  body  has  decided  that  no  further  action 
will  take  place),  the  documents  and  any  materials 
required  by  the  inspector  are  no  longer  needed.  The 
interests of  the  data  user,  and  perhaps  the  data 
subjects,  requires  that  these  be  correctly disposed  of, 
by  being  returned  or  destroyed . However,  it may  facilitate  a  subsequent  inspection of.the 
same  system  if  some  of  the  materials  are  retained.  This 
should  be  done  only  with  the  consent  of  the  data  user, 
and  what  is  retained .should  be  agreed  by  the  data  user 
and  the  commissioning  body.  The  commissioning  body 
rather  than  the  inspector  should  be  responsible  for 
retaining  these materials,  and  must  make  suitable 
arrangements  for  their  security. 
If the Authority decides  to  retain  some  materials within 
its legal  powers  (e.g.  for  its own  analytical  or 
statistical purposes),  information ethics  requires  that 
the  data  user  (and  perhaps  the  data  subject)  be  told  what 
information  is  stored,  by  whom,  for  what  purposes,  for 
what  length  of  time,  and  who  will  have  access  to  it. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
6.7  The  inspector 
6.7.1  The  inspector's qualities 
The  following  qualities are  required  in  the  inspector: 
1.  Understanding  of  data  protection.  He  must  appreciate 
the  public  concern  in  this matter,  and  be  familiar 
with  the  means  which  are  proposed  for  preventing 
troubles  arising  from  personal  data.  He  must 
understand  the  regulations,  and  be  able  to  interpret 
them  in practical  terms,  and  work  out  their 
implications  for  the  system  which  is  being  inspected . 
2.  Experience  in  the  way  human  beings  in  organisations 
work.  He  must  recognise  the  significance  of  such 
factors  as  authority,  bureaucracy,  habit,  laziness, 
corporate  ethos. 
3.  Up-to-date  knowledge  of  any  technology  used  in  the 
system,  e.g.  computers,  communication  links, 
encryption  • 
4.  General  inspection skills,  such  as  can  hardly  be 
acquired  except  from  experience  in  auditing, 
investigation or  other  inspection:  e.g.  interviewing, 
a  nose  for  something  wrong . 5.  Trustworthiness.  The  inspector  must  have  access  to 
information  on  which  the  data  user  places  the  highest 
degrees  of  secrecy  (e.g.  confidences  of  clients, 
security  arrangemen~s,  trade  secrets}.  The  inspector 
must  have  the  integrity  and  ability to protect  such 
information  throughout  the  inspection  and  afterwards. 
In  some  cases  (e.g.  for  national  security  systems}  the 
information  must  not  be  disclosed  even  to  the 
commissioning  body. 
6.7.2  Who  should  inspect? 
Although  all  these qualities  (6.7.1}  are  not  necessary  in 
the  highest  degree  in· every  inspector,  they  represent  an 
unusual  array  of gifts.  Perhaps  only  a  team  consisting  of 
several  persons will  contain  them  all.  Computer  expertise 
of  a  special  type  may  have  to  be  bought  in  on  contract. 
Even  if gifted  individuals  are  available,  there  ate 
advantages  in  having  at  least  two  people  carrying  out  an 
inspection:  apart  from  compensating  for  each  other's 
deficiencies,  they  can  check  each  other's work,  give  second 
opinions  on  certain matters,  serve  as  a  sounding-board  for 
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fresh  ideas,  and  stand  back  when  the  other  in  involved 
(e.g.  in  an  interview).  In  addition,  they  reduce  the 
effectiveness of  possible  corrupting  pressures  (6.7.5), 
and  give  more  confidence  in  the  objectivity of  their 
report • 
The  wide  range  of gifts  required  in  an  inspection  forms 
the  basis  of  a  professional  specialism,  and  it  is  to  be 
expected  that organisations  specialising  in  data 
protection  inspection will  arise.  It  is  in  the  interests 
of  all  concerned  in  the  correct  use  of  personal  data  that 
this profession  is properly  structured  with  regard  to 
such  matters  as  training,  technological  updating, 
qualifications,  career  development,  professional  ethics  . 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  Authority  should  directly 
employ  full  time  inspectors,  but  it must  be  able  to  call 
on  then  when  necessary  to  carry  out  statutory  inspections 
at  its own  instigation.  The  Authority  must  satisfy 
itself that  any  inspectors  whom  it  uses  are  competent . 
t-87 6.7.3  Relation  to  financial  auditing 
It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  financial  auditing  is  an 
existing profession  which  could  with  a  little effort 
expand  to  include  data protection  inspection.  Of  the 
qualities listed  in 6.7.1,  financial  auditors  already 
need  for  their  work  items  2,  4,  5~  some  use  item  3~  none 
need  item 1.  It follows  that  financial  auditors  as  such 
are  not  competent  to  carry  out  a  data protection 
inspection. 
But  they  may  be  the  best-placed  group  to  move  into  this 
area,  if  they  acquire  the qualities  in  which  they  are  at 
present deficient.  Two  additional  factor  favour  them: 
1.  Financial  auditing  is  already  accepted  as  routine  by 
parts of  most  organizations,  and  auditors  are  received 
in  a  co-operative  spirit. 
2.  Sometimes  it may  be  possible  to  combine  the  data 
protection  inspection  with  a  financial  audit,  with 
advantages  for  both  sides. 
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6.7.4  Questions  of  judgement 
It will  be  clear  from  many  parts of  this  report  that  the 
inspector  must  make  judgements  on  a  wide  variety of 
matters.  The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  point  out 
that his  work  will  take  him  into  areas  ~here his  opinion 
is  not  authoritative.  What  these  are  will  depend  on  the 
scope  attributed  to  the  inspector,  but  they  will  probably 
include  interpretation of  the  regulations  where  they  are 
not  precise  . 
It is  important  that  the  inspector  does  not  go  outside 
the  areas  of  his  competence,  and  therefore  that  he  should 
have  some  means  of  disposing  of  such  matters.  This  will 
normally  consist of  passing  them  up  to  the  commissioning 
body  for  a  decision  . 
6.7.5  Pressures  on  the  inspector 
The  data  user  may  apply  several  types  of  improper 
pressure  to  the  inspector: 
1.  Time:  It may  be  said  that  too  much  time  is  being 
spent  on  the  inspection,  particularly  if  it  is  taking 
longer  than  was  planned . 2.  Cost:  The  data  user  may  argue  that  his  work  is  being 
excessively disrupted  by  the  inspection  activity. 
3.  Obstruction:  The  inspector  may  find  that  his  work  is 
made  increasingly difficult  by  non-co-operation, 
delays,  unnecessary  complication,  and  even  sabotage. 
4.  Sympathy:  The  suggestion  may  be  made  that  although 
the  system  is  faulty,  the  people  concerned  are  doing 
their  best  and  cannot  usefully  be  penalised. 
5.  Politics:  e.g.  complaining  or  threatening  to  complain 
about  the  inspector's  head. 
6.  Bribes:  Not  only  money,  but  any  measure  to  please  the 
inspector  personally  to  induce  him  to  leniency. 
7.  Bluff:  e.g.  suggesting  that  if  the  inspector  knew  his 
job  he  would  be  satisfied with  the  information  he  had. 
Attempts  may  be  made  to  overload  him  with  excessive 
amounts  of  documentation. 
8.  Personal:  e.g.  overbearing VIPs. 
No  uniform  means  of  neutralising  these  pressures  can  be 
relied  upon.  The  inspector  must  be  aware  of  their 
possibility,  must  know  how  to  recognise  them,  and  must 
have  multi-faceted  integrity to  resist  them.  His  task  is 
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made  easier  to  the  extent  to  which  he  is  supported  by  the 
commissioning  body.  He  should  include  in  his  report 
comment  on  any  substantial  attempts  to  use  improper 
pressure  . 
6.7.6  How  helpful  should  the  inspector  be? 
The  principal  purpose  of  the  inspection  is  objective 
assessment  of  the  system.  To  combine  this  with  directly 
helping  the  data  user  to  improve  the  system  risks 
blurring  responsibilities:  measurement  and  correction 
are  separate activities,  and  one  should  beware  of 
compromising  the  former  for  the  sake  of  the  latter. 
However,  the  ultimate  aim  of  inspection  is  to  improve 
performance  in  data protection,  and  at  present  there  is 
not  so  much  knowledge  and  experience  that  one  should 
willingly silence  one  source  of  information.  On  the 
content,  meaning  and  implications  of  the  law,  for 
example,  the  inspector  will  probably  know  much  more  than 
the  data  user . The  question  of  giving  advice  about  the  system  is  more 
controversial,  but  even  here  the  balance  of  advantage  to 
the  community  suggests  that  the  inspector  be  permitted  to 
advise  the  data  user,  ~rovided that  he  is  careful  not  to 
let this distort his  judgement  as  inspector,  nor 
prejudice  further  inspections  by  implying  that  if his 
advice  is  followed  subsequent  inspections will  approve 
the  system.  He  must  be  careful  about  exposing  himself  to 
financial  pressures  by  selling consultancy  to  an 
organization which  he  inspects;  this  must  impose  tight 
limits  on  the  scale  of  the  advice  he  can  give.  As  in  any 
matter  which  might  compromise  the  inspector's  role,  the 
commissioning  body  should  be  kept  fully  informed:  the 
inspector  should  report  the  general  content  and  scale  of 
any  substantial  help  he  provides  to  the  data  user. 
In  a  voluntary  inspection,  the  duty  of  preserving  the 
independence  of  the  inspection  may  not  be  so  great  as  to 
overrule  the  value  of· involving  the  inspector  in 
improving  the  system. 
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6.7.7  Complaints  against  the  inspector 
It  is  unsafe  to  assume  that  the  inspector  will  be  perfect, 
per  therefore  provision  mqst  be  made  for  checking  his  work 
and  dealing  with  criticism,  whether  justified or  not.  In 
the  case  of  a  voluntary  inspection,  the  commissioning  body 
and  the  organisation  are  either  identical  o~  so  close  that 
the  controversy  is  essentially  an  internal matter.  In  the 
case  an  of  a  statutory  inspection,  the  law  is  involved,  and 
it is  therefore  a  matter  of  public  concern  to  resolve 
disagreements  satisfactorily. 
The  following  may  be  expected  to  be  the  main  source  of 
controversy  between  the  inspector  and  the  data  user 
(objection  to  the  decision  to  inspect,  perhaps  on  grounds  of 
frequency  of  inspection,  should  be  addressed  to  the 
commissioning  body  or  the  one  which  made  the  decision): 
1.  Objection  to  the  ext~nt of  the  inspection's 
interference with  the  work  of  the  data  user. 
2.  The  right  to  withhold  infomation  which  is  considered 
inessential  for  the  inspection,  even  if  it would 
facilitate  the  inspector's  work . 
3.  Lack  of  trust  in  the  inspector  personally. 
4.  Disagreement  with  the  interpretation of  the  regulations . 
5.  Disagreement  with  the  interpretation of  the  evidence . It is  conceiveable  that  a  data  subject  or  a  member  of  the 
general  public  might  have  some  criticism of  an  inspector 
or  inspection.  If  any  party objects  to  any  aspect  of  the 
inspection,  it should  have  a  clear  line  of  complaint  to 
the  commissioning  body.  In  the  case  of  statutory 
inspections,  there  must  be  a  means  of  complaining  against 
the  commissioning  body.  This  entails  that  the 
commissioning  body  should  not  be  the  final  legal 
authority,  or  at least that,  if  they  are  both  roles  of 
the  authority,  these  roles  are  seen  to  be  independent. 
The  commissioning  body  should  ensure  that  the  data  user 
knows  his  rights of  complaints  and  his  means  of 
exercising  them. 
The  philosophy  of Section  6  is  that  any  important 
activity must  be  checked.  Inspection  is  such  an 
activity,  and  it is  therefore desirable  that  the 
commissioning  body  shquld  take  steps  to  ensure  tijat 
inspections  are  carried out  correctly  from  every  point  of 
view. 
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6.7.8  The  inspector's  answerability 
Since  the  inspector  is  appointed  by  the  commissioning 
body,  he  is primarily  answerable  to  that.  However, 
claims  on  his  loyalty  come  from  at  least  two  other 
directions: 
1.  The  law:  A citizen  is  normally  expected  to  report 
evidence  of  any  criminal  action  which  he  knows.  If  as 
part of  his  inspection  he  incidentally discovers  an 
illegality which  has  nothing  to  do  with  data 
protection,  must  he  report  it? 
2.  Ethics:  Working  relationships  between  two  parties 
such  as  the  inspector  and  the  data  user,  are 
inefficient  unless  there  is  some  degree  of  mutual 
respect.  Does  this  require  the  inspector  to  connive 
at  minor  deviations  from  the  regulations? 
There  can  be  no  easy  complete  answer  to  such  questions 
which  overlap  conflicting obligations.  Until  such  time 
as  the  inspection activity  has  been  established  by 
experience,  the  inspector  should  be  wary  of  giving  so 
great  a  weight  to  any  one  obligation  that  it effectively 
overrules  the  others.  This  would  suggest  that  the 
inspector  should  concentrate  on  the  substantial  matters 
which  are  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  data 
protection  . The  one  exception  to  this  suggestion  of  overlooking  minor 
deviation  is  that  of  corruption:  any  attempt  to  bribe  an 
inspector  is  potentially  so  dangerous  to  th  whole 
inspection activity  that  it should  be  reported  to  the 
commissioning  body.  Consideration  needs  to  be  given  also 
to  means  of  helping  an  inspector  to  resist  improper 
pressures  from  the  commissioning  body. 
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6.8  Further  considerations 
6.8.0  Introduction 
In  section 6.8  are  discussed  all  issues  relating  to 
inspection  which  did  not  fit  in  anywhere  else. 
6.8.1  Frequency  of  inspection 
The  ideas  behind  repeated  inspection  of  one  system  are 
twofold.  Firstly,  there  may  be  some  doubt  about  the 
effectiveness  of  the  first  (or  indeed  any  single) 
inspection  of  the  system.  Secondly,  it may  be  believed 
that  the  system  has  changed  sufficiently  since  last  being 
inspected,  so  that  it  is  to  a  considerable  extent  an 
uninspected  system  . 
As  regards  to  the  first,  it must  be  recognised  that  no 
inspector  and  no  inspection  is  perfect,  and  hat  if  the 
system  presents  a  very  serious  risk  (e.g.  because  of  the 
data  which  it holds,  or  because  of  its method  of  working) 
and  is difficult  to  inspect  thoroughly  (e.g.  because  of 
size  or  complexity),  a  repeated  inspection,  even  within  a 
short  time,  may  be  justified.  The  inspector  should  be 
encouraged  to  comment  to  the  commissioning  body  on  the 
suitable  interval  before  the  inspection,  as  his 
subjective  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  his 
inspection  may  contain  information  for  which  he  cannot 
produce  evidence . As  regard  to  the  second,  the  data  user  may  be  required  to 
notify  the  commissioning  body  whenever  there  is  a 
substantial change  to  the  system,  such  as  might  warrant 
re-inspection.  If  there  is  no  such  requirement,  or  if 
there  is  suspicion that  the  requirement  it not  complied 
with,  more  frequent  re-inspection  is  justified.  The 
commissioning  body  should  in  such  cases  judge  the 
likelihood  of  such  a  change  taking  place,  bearing  in  mind 
both  the  nature  of  the  system  {as  being  conducive  to 
change  or  not},  and  the  motivation  of  the  data  user;  in 
this,  again,  the  unproveable  opinion  of  the  previous 
inspector  may  be  valuable. 
Since  both  of  these possible  reasons  for  repeated 
inspection  depend  on  the  system  and  other  particular 
circumstances,  no  single  frequency  {such  as  once  a  year) 
can  be  generally  recommended. 
6.8.2  Strictness of  inspection 
The  inspection  procedure  described  in  sections· 6.4  to 6.6 
is  intended  to  be  capable  of  being  almost  exhaustive  in 
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its scope  and  depth.  For  many  inspections  such  as 
thoroughness  and  consequent  costs  may  be  considered 
inordinate,  and  the  inspector  should  select parts  of  the 
procedure  which  he  thinks  will  give  him  sufficient 
information  . 
For  planning  purposes,  he  may  have  to  take  an  initial 
view  of  the  desirable  level  of  strictness;  this  may  be 
based  on  unreliable  information  such  as  the  reputation  of 
the  organization.  At  an  early  stage  in  the  inspection  he 
should  attempt  a  more  reliable  judgement,  still based 
inevitably  on  incomplete  information,  but  good  enough  for 
operating  purposes.  Inspectors  in  other  areas  (financial 
auditing,  taxation)  claim  that  they  can  very  quickly 
sense  the  general  level  of  performance  of  the  system 
which  they  are  inspecting.  As  a  first  step,  the 
inspector's  impression  of  the  awareness  and  ability of 
the  management  of  the  organization  (6.5.2)  will  be  a  good 
guide • 
The  inspector  must  be  prepared  to  change  his  level  of 
strictness  as  the  inspection proceeds,  it  the  accumulated 
evidence  justifies it.  He  should  beware  of  being 
prejudiced  by  his  first  impression,  and  must  be  willing 
to  apply  very different  levels of  strictness  to  different 
parts  of  the  system.  He  should  have  in  mind  three 
different patterns of  compliance: 1.  Fairly  uniform  throughout  the  system,  whether  at  a 
high  or  low  level  of  compliance. 
2.  A much  lower  level  of  compliance  in  one  or  more  small 
parts,  caused  primarily  by  negligence,  and  with  no 
great effort to  concealment. 
3.  An  intolerable  failure  in  one  or  more  small  parts,  due 
to  an  essential violation of  the  principles  of  data 
protection,  and  possibly  with  a  serious  attempt  at 
concealment. 
The  prevailing  opinion  in  data protection circles at 
present  is  that  the  first  two  of  these  patterns  are  by 
far  the  most  common,  and  therefore  most  inspections 
should  be  conducted  in  a  manner  suitable  for  them.  But 
much  of  the  public  concern  is  focused  on  the  third 
pattern,  and  an  inspection  method  which  cannot  expose 
such  systems  will  gen.e.rally  be  considered  useless. 
6.8.3  Attitude  of  data  user 
The  attitude of  the  data  user  may  make  a  great  difference 
to  the  inspector's  work.  If  he  is  co-operative,  open, 
efficient  and  sympathetic  the  work  will  be  much  easier 
and  more  efficient.  The  inspector  should  therefore  seek 
to  encourage  such  attitudes. 
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However,  the  inspector  must  not  depend  on  meeting  such 
attitudes,  and  if  he  does  meet  them  must  not  rely 
excessively  upon  them  instead  of  doing  the  work  himself. 
He  must  not  simply  aqcept  everything  he  is  told.  If  the 
~ata user  never  feels  at  least slightly  uneasy,  the 
inspector  is  not  being  effective  (unless  the  system  is 
extraordinarily  near  to  perfection) • 
6.8.4  Secrecy  of  inspection procedure 
It might  be  feared  that disclosure  of  the  procedure  which 
is  followed  by  inspectors  would  diminish  its effectiveness  . 
An  unscrupulous  data  user  might  discover  blind  spots  which 
he  could  exploit.  This  risk  appears  fairly  small,  and  in 
any  case  the  procedure  must  not  be  so  rigid  and  static that 
it contains  reliable  loop-holes  (cf.  6.2.5).  If  there  is  a 
large  permanent  flaw  in  the  procedure,  the  sooner  it  is 
exposed  and  removed  the  better.  A procedure  which  depends 
on  long  term  secrecy  is vulnerable. 
There  are  however  some  tactical details  whose  secrecy 
deserves  consideration:  for  example,  the  timing  of 
unannounced  inspections,  which  particular  samples  of  data 
will  be  examined.  These  are  not  fixed  items  in  the 
inspection  procedure  of  the  type  which  is  discussed  here. 
6  -I  OJ Otherwise,  there are  advantages  in  disclosing details of 
the  inspection procedure:  it will  help  to  de-mystify  the 
subject  in  the  minds  of  data  users;  it will  reassure  them 
and  the  public  that  the  procedure  is  efficient  and 
practical;  it will  help  data  users  to  comply  with  the 
regulations  by  encouraging  self-inspection.  These 
advantages  decisively  favour  disclosure  of  the 
procedure. 
6.8.5  Publication of  the  inspection  report 
The  inspection  report  is  the  property  of  the 
commissioning  body,  and  the  main  purpose  of  the 
inspection  (checking  the  system's  compliance  with  the 
regulations,  6.0.2)  does  not  require  the  report  to  be 
disclosed  to  anybody  else.  The  following  are  the 
arguments  against  further  disclosure: 
1.  It could  give  the  data  user  help  in  tampering  w·ith 
evidence  which  might  be  used  in  legal  proceedings 
against  him;  for  example,  he  might  improve  his 
security arrangement. 
2.  It might  expose  the  inspector  to  a  charge  of 
defamation. 
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3.  It might  prejudice  legal  proceedings  against  the  data 
user • 
4.  It might  comprom~se the  security of  the  system  and 
others  like  it,  and  breach  confidences  of  the 
organization.  .. 
5.  It might  give  an  insight  into  the  inspection  process 
which  could  help  exploitation of  its weaknesses  to 
avoid  detection of  non-compliance • 
6.  The  inspector  may  be  inhibited  from  making  clear 
criticisms,  because  he  would  have  to  spend  excessive 
time  preparing  defences  for  his  conclusions • 
The  following  are  the  arguments  in  favour  of  disclosure 
of  the  inspection  report  to  the  data  user: 
7.  It  is  normal  professional practice  (e.g.  in  financial 
auditing,  computer  security  consultancy)  to  show  a 
draft of  the  report  to  the  inspected  organisation. 
This  tends  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  report  by 
removing  errors  and  unbalanced  judgements;  it 
increases  the  confidence  of  the  data  user  in  the 
fairness  of  the  inspection,  and  (if  he  know  beforehand) 
will  encourage  his  co-operation  in  the  irispection;  and 
it tends  to  forestall  criticism of  the  report. 
8.  It helps  the  data  user  improve  his  system  from  the 
point of  view  of  data protection. 
6-/03 The  following  are  the  arguments  in  favour  of  publishing 
the  inspection  report: 
9.  It tells the  public~  including  therefore  the  data 
subjects,  about  one  of  the  most  important  qualities 
of  the  system,  viz.  does  it satisfy the  regulations? 
10.  In  conjunction with  other  inspection  reports,  it 
gives  the  public  information  about  the  general  state 
of  data protection,  thereby  justifying  confidence  or 
alarm. 
11.  It might  give  data  users  information  about  data 
protection measures,  thereby  tending  to  improve  the 
general  standards  of  performance. 
Because  of  the  advantages  of  disclosure,  particularly.at 
the present  early  stage  of  data protection  where  data 
users  and  the  public  are  not  fully  aware  of  the  issues, 
it is  recommended  that  a  statutory  inspection  report 
should  always  be  shown  to  the  data  user  in  both  draft  and 
final  form  (except  where  there  is  a  serious  risk  of 
tampering  with  the  evidence),  and  that  the  inspection 
report  should  be  made  available  to  the  public  with  only 
the  minimum  reservations  necessary  in  view  of  arguments 
3  and  4  above.  The  risks  associated  with  argument  2  and 
5  above  should  be  accepted  by  the  commissioning  body,  and 
with  6  faced  bravely  by  the  inspector. 
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The  decision  about  the  reservations  in  public  disclosure 
should  be  made  by  the  commissioning  body,  having  heard 
the  opinions  of  the  data  user  and  the  organization  . 
6.8.6  Inspecting  the  Authority  . 
The  Authority  is  itself  inevitably  a  data  user,  holding 
at  least  the  following  classes  of  personal  data: 
1.  Personnel  files  of  its own  employees  and  control 
board • 
2.  Contacts  within data-using  organizations  with  which 
the  Authority deals  • 
3.  Particulars of  aggrieved  data  subjects  and  other 
complainants • 
4.  Members  of  the  public  and  public  figures  such  as 
politicians,  journalists,  lawyers • 
5.  Data  belonging  to  a  data  user  which  is  held  {perhaps 
only  temporarily)  for  some  legal  or  administrative 
purpose,  e.g.  inspection  • 
6  -/OS" Some  of  this data will  be  of  high  sensitivity,  and  may  be 
in  a  form  which  subjects  it to  legal  requirements.  The 
manner  in  which  the  Authority  handles  its own  personal 
data  is  just  as  much  a  matter  of  public  interest  as  that 
of  other  organizations,  and  should  therefore  be  subject 
to  the  same  rigor  of  inspection. 
Some  people will  favour  this  requirement  to  submit  to 
inspection  as  tending  to  ensure  that  inspections 
generally  are  not  onerous  to  data  users.  Others, 
similarly,  will  fear  that  the  Authority  will  be  tempted 
to  weaken  the  inspection  for  its own  convenience.  If 
inspections  (contrary  to·the  author's  expectations)  are 
commonly  for  good  reason  traumatic  to  data  users,  the 
Authority  must  resist  internal  pressures  to  weaken  them. 
To  give  confidence  that  the  inspection  of  the  Author~ty 
is carried out  impartially,  the  inspector  must  be  seen  to 
have  some  independence  of  the  Authority.  Nothing  which 
is  said  in  section 6  implies  that  an  inspector  must  be  an 
employee  of  the Authority,  and  in  the  present  case  it  is 
desirable  that  he  should  not  be.  Similarly,  it  is 
appropriate  that  the  commissioning  body  for  this 
inspection  should  not  be  the Authority,  but  perhaps  some 
other  department  of  state. 
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6.8.7  The  cost of  the  inspection 
There  are  many  components  of  the  cost  of  inspection: 
1.  Salary of  inspector,  and  any  supporting  staff provided 
by  the  commissioning  body. 
2.  Out-of-pocket  expenses  of  inspector:  travel, 
subsistence,  etc. 
3.  Miscellaneous  costs  of  inspector:  stationery,  phone 
calls,  etc. 
4.  Working  accommodation  during  inspection visit  • 
5.  Organization's  supporting  staff during  the 
inspection • 
6.  Organization's  consumables  cost:  stationery,  use  of 
computer  and  other  equipment • 
7.  Costs  of disruption  during  the  inspection • 
8.  Opportunity  costs:  losses  because  of  actions  not 
taken  because  of  the  inspection • 
Not  included  in  these  is  the  cost  of  initial  or 
consequential  compliance  with  the  regulations,  which 
should  not  be  incurred  just  because  of  the  inspection  . There  will  also  be  some  benefits  for  the  data  user  and 
the  organization  from  the  inspection,  including 
improvements  to  data quality,  understanding  of  the 
workings  of  the  syste~,  and  improved  relations  with  the 
data  subjects.  There  is  evidence  that  these  benefits  can 
be  substantial. 
It is difficult  to  estimate  what  the  nett cost  of  the 
inspection will  be,  but  it must  depend  on  the  scope  and 
strictness of  the  inspection  and  in  some  circumstances  it 
will  be  heavy.  This  will generate pressures  for  the 
inspection  to  be  made  cheaper,  if  necessary  by 
considerable  loss  of  quality.  There  is  evidently  need 
here  for  a  balance  to  be  struck,  and  in  the  present 
limited  state of  knowledge  of  data protection  inspection 
there  must  be  an  element  of  judgement.  It would  help  if 
the  actual  costs  of  inspections  were  reported,  so  that 
informed  decisions  could  be  made  in  subsequent  cases. 
The  task  of  assessing  the  actual  costs  would  be 
difficult,  but  might  be  added  to  the  duties  of  the 
inspector. 
For  voluntary  inspections,  the  cost will  normally  be 
shared  within  the  organization  in  some  agreed  way.  For 
statutory  inspections,  it  is  a  matter  of  law  who  will  pay 
for  them,  and  the  following  considerations  ar·e  relevant: 
1.  It appears  inequitable to  compel  an  organization  to 
pay  for  an  activity which  may  result  in  its  own 
presecution. 
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2.  Law  enforcement  is  normally  paid  for  by  public  funds • 
3.  Financial  audits  are  paid  for  by  the  organization. 
4.  If  an  organization  knows  that  it will  have  to  pay  for 
an  inspection,  it has  an  incentive  for  helping  the 
inspection process  to  be  efficient,  in  particular  to 
save  the  inspector's  time.  Thus  the  general 
orderliness of  the  system,  the  quality of  the 
documentation,  and  the  extent  to  which  it keeps  clear 
of  unnecessary data protection dangers  would  be  all 
improved. 
5.  However,  bearing  the  costs  of  a  difficult  inspection 
is  a  blunt  instrument  for  penalising  an  unhelpful  data 
user . 
6.  Some  of  the  costs  of  inspection  (e.g.  numbers  7,  8 
above)  are  difficult. to  quantify,  and  are  therefore 
almost  inevitably  borne  by  the  organization  • 
6--IDf 6.8.8  Determination of  the  regulations 
The  inspector  will  usually  be  asked  to  check  a  system's 
compliance,  not with  a  specific set  of  regulations,  but 
with  "the  law",  by  which  the  commissioning  body  may  mean 
some  or  all of  the  laws  which  apply  to  the  system.  In 
simple  cases,  only  a  single data  law  may  apply.  In  many 
cases,  even  for  systems  entirely within  a  single  country, 
there  may  be  several  laws  with  independent  and  sometimes 
conflicting demands.  Within  international  communities 
such  as  the  EEC  there  is  the  possibility of  oyerlapping 
national  and  international  laws.  Systems  which  are  not 
entirely within  one  country  may  be  subject  to  several 
national  laws;  even  apparently  local  systems  may  receive 
some  data  from  abroad,  or  send  some  of  it there.  Section 
1  illustrates  the  profusion  of  transnational  data 
traffic.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  all  these 
complexities will  increase,  at  least  for  the  next  few 
years. 
These  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  this: 
1.  The  inspector  should  be  wary  of  accepting  a  commision 
which  asks  him  to  check  compliance  with  "the  law"  in 
general. 
2.  A fully  competent  inspector  would  need  extraordinarily 
wide  knowledge. 
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3.  To  avoid  dependence  of  such  wide-ranging  and 
complicated  issues,  an  organization  and  an  inspector 
would  be  wise  to  aim  primarily at  the  generality of 
data protection principles  (6.3),  though  they  cannot 
entirely escape details of  the  law . 
6.8.9  Relation  to  security 
Privacy  and  security are  often  regarded  as  almost  the 
same  thing,  and  there  is  certainly a  large  overlap 
between  them.  There  are  seveal  differences  which  are 
worth  noting.  Data  protection  is  concerned  with. ensuring 
that  (personal)  data  is  used  only  in  ways  compatible  with 
the  interests of  those  concerned  with  it,  as  expressed  in 
principles  or  regulations.  Security  is  concerned  to 
ensure  that  some  facility  (e.g.  a  computer)  works  as  its 
owner  requires  and  not  to  his disadvantage. 
If  an  organisation  has  good  security,  it satisfies  one 
requirement  of data protection,  namely  restricted  access 
to  personal  data.  Other  requirements,  such  as  data 
quality,  may  be  partly met.  In practice,  an  organization 
which  has  good  security  is  likely  to bave  a  businesslike 
approach  to all  its work,  and  this would  provide  a  good 
base  for  data protection.  But  some  requirements  for  data 
protection are  not  needed  for  security  (e.g.  notifying 
the  data  subject). 
6-tt f An  organization which  takes  security seriously  should 
have  a  person  explicitly  responsible  for  it.  This 
person's rdsponsibilities  could  be  extended  to  include 
data protection  if  its special  requirements  were  noted. 
The  requirements  of  security  and  data  protection 
occasionally conflict  (e.g.  security may  be  increased  by 
having  numerous  distributed  copies  of data,  but  privacy 
is diminished  thereby),  but  can  be  reconciled  in 
practice. 
6.8.10  International aspects 
The  international  dimension  affects data protection  at 
many  points,  and  this- section  summarises  its  implications 
for  inspection. 
1.  A  system  which  is  not  located  entirely within  one 
country  may  be  subject  to  the  laws  of  more  than  one 
country  (cf.6.8.8).  Provided  the  regulations .are  well 
defined,  this  should  not  pose  any  new  problem  for  the 
inspector. 
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2.  A system which  is  widely distributed will  generally  be 
more  difficult  to  inspect  than  one  which  is  localised, 
·for  two  reasons:  firstly,  inspection visits  to  more 
than  one  place  may  be  ~eeded;  secondly,  the 
transmission  of  data  between  the different points 
within  the  system  by  any  means  must  be  inspected. 
Both  of  these  are  more  time-consuming  and  complicated 
if  international  factors  are  added  to  geographical 
distance. 
3.  For  important  international  systems  it may  be 
necessary  to  include  people  of different  nations  in 
the  inspection  team.  Such  co-operation  accords  well 
with  a  widespread  wish  to  harmonise  data  protection 
practice,  but  it may  in  the  short  term  complicate  the 
inspection  • 
6.8.11  Computer  bureaux 
The  widespread  use  of  other  people's  computers  and  other 
facilities  for  carrying  out  some  or  all  of  one's data 
processing  affects  the  inspection.  From  the  poirit  of 
view  of  data protection  inspection,  the  essential 
characteristic of  a  bureau  is  that  it  is part  of  a 
system,  but  not  part  of  the  organization.  This  has 
several  consequences: 
6-113 1.  Legal  and  functional  responsibility  for  the  system  is 
shared~  there  may  be  a  clear  division  of 
responsibility,  so  that  the  inspector  knows  to  which 
part  a  regulation. applies,  and  to  which  part  he  must 
look  for  particular  information,  bu  there  may  not,  in 
which  case  the  inspector's  work  may  be  complicated. 
2.  The  powers  of  the  inspector  may  not  apply  within  the 
bureau  as  within  the  organization~  in  the  case  of 
statutory  inspection,  the  regulations  or  the  Authority 
may  not  cover  the  bureau~  in  a  voluntary  inspection, 
the  commissioning  body  may  have  little power  within 
the  bureau. 
3.  The  division of  responsibility  between  the 
organization  and  the  bureau  poses  problems  for  data 
protection,  as  there  may  be  duties  which  are  not 
accepted  by  either  side,  and  inconsistencies  and 
conflict  between  the  two  sides.  The  inspector  must 
take  account  of  these  problems  in  his  inspection. 
4.  The  data  user  may  be  largely  unaware  of  his 
responsibilities  under  the  regulations~  in  extreme 
cases  he  may  know  lettle about  computers  and may  not 
realise  that  the  law  applies  to  him. 
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5.  Many  computer  bueaux  are  (for  sound  commercial 
reasons)  run  in  a  most  business  like  manner:  well 
organised,  carefully documented,  security-conscious, 
fully  au  fait  with  legal  requirements,  supportive  of 
less  competent  data  users.  Such  a  bureau  will  save 
the  inspector  a  lot  of  work. 
6.  It may  be  convenient  to  inspect  at  one  time  the  work 
of  several  organizations  who  use  the  same  bureau  (the 
Swedish  DIB  spends  a  high  proportion  of  its  inspection 
effort  on  bureaux);  for  the  purposes  of  inspection  it 
is probably  best  to  regard  these  as  several  distinct 
systems  for  which  some  of  the  information  need  not  be 
gathered  separately  . 
7.  A bureau's list of  data  users  may  be  a  useful  source 
of  information,  e.g.  leading  to  data  users  who  have 
not  registered  • 
6.8.12  Non-standard  operations 
Data  processing  systems  sometimes  fail  to  work  normally. 
When  this  happens,  either  the  system  stops,  or  unplanned 
alternative opeations  take  place,  or  planned  alternative 
operations  take  place  (or  some  mixture  of  all  three). 
6  -tis-The  inspector  should  take  an  interest  in  these  non-
standard  operating possibilities  (which  include  start-up, 
testing,  breakdown,  maintenance,  system  change,  standby, 
special  running)  for  two  distinct  reasons.  Firstly,  the 
abnormal  mode  of  working  may  violate  the  regulations. 
Even  a  stopped  system  could  unfairly  injure  a  data 
subject  (if  he  has  a  right  to  expect  some  service  from 
it),  and,  to  the  extent  to  which  it frustrates  the 
intentions of  the  organization,  reflects  badly  on  the 
organization.  An  improvised  mode  of  working  may 
sacrifice data protection principles  to  expediency; 
existence  of  a  plannned  alternative  method  of  working 
indicates  that  the  organisation  takes  seriously  its 
responsibilities  in  operating  the  system. 
If there  is  such  a  plan  the  inspector  should  examine  it 
in  the  same  way  as  he  would  that  for  the  working  system, 
so  far  as  it is possible  and  to  the  extent  to  which  he 
judges  it to  be  necessary.  If  no  plan  for  alternative 
modes  of  working  exist,  the  inspector  should  attempt  to 
assess  the  danger  this presents  to  the  observance  of 
regulations:  in  a  small  simple  system  which  is  unlikely 
to  suffer  a  substantial  breakdown,  has  plenty  of  spare 
capacity  and  no  sensitive data,  the  danger  may  be 
negligible;  in  a  large,  complicated,  unreliable,  fully-
stretched  system  containing  much  sensitive data,  it  is 
intolerable.  While  realising  that  consideations  of  cost 
have  a  legitimate place  in  the  drawing  up  of  plans 
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(because  the  rights of  the  data  subject  do  not  completely 
overrule  those  of  the  data  user),  the  inspector  should 
not  accept  unforeseen  accidents  as  a  sufficient  reason 
for  the  breaking  of  regulations  • 
Secondly,  experience  shows  that  non-standard  operations 
often  reveals  unnoticed  security weaknesses;  a  high 
proportion of detected  computer  crime,  especially fraud, 
has  been  exposed  during  non-standard  operation;  and  a 
disproportionate  amount  of  computer  crime  occurs  during 
non-standard  running . 
6.8.13  Sources  of  information 
An  inspector  who  wishes  to  maximise  the  amount  of 
information  he  receives  concerning  a  system  must  not 
restrict himself  to  what  the  organisation  wishes  to  give 
him.  There  should  be  no  question  of  it being  unethical 
for  an  inspector  to  use  any  source  of  information  about 
the  system  he  is  inspecting,  due  weight  being  given  to 
its credibility.  A  high  proportion  of  detected ·computer 
crime  has  been  exposed  initially because  an  insider 
decided  to  disclose  improprieties.  Subordinate  employees 
6  -(( 7 will  often give  a  different,  and  in  some  respect  more 
accurate,  description of  reality  then  those  in  charge. 
The  inspector  should  attempt  to  ensure  that  subordinates 
can  speak  freely.  Disgruntled  ex-employees  of  the 
organization,  aggrieved  data subjects,  the  public  in 
general  should  be  encouraged  in  appropriate  cases  to  give 
information,  although  much  of  it must  be  discounted  as 
unreliable.  However,  it  is  no  part  of  an  inspector's  job 
to  encourage  public  expression  of criticism of  a  system 
(e.g.  in  the  media),  which  is  effectively not  inspection 
but  punishment. 
6.8.14  Inspecting  databases 
Sophisticated database  systems  of  many  sorts  are  becoming 
fairly  common.  ("Sophisticated"  in  this  context  means 
loosely  that  the  data  user  does  not  understand  how  the 
data  which  he  uses  is  stored  and  retrieved.)  Such 
systems  have  several  implications  for  the  data protection 
inspection: 
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1.  The  definitiop of  the  "system"  which  is  to  be 
inspected  may  be  unclear,  as  the  personal  data  may  be 
a  small  part of  the  whole,  and  the  data  users  a  small 
proportion  of  all  users  of  the  system  • 
2.  The  precise definition of  the  purpose  of  the  system 
may  be  difficult,  and  the  list of  uses  and  users 
almost  unmanageably  big  and  constantly changing. 
3.  The  levels  of  security,  and  of  data  quality with 
regard  to  accuracy  and  up-to-dateness,  may  be  high,  as 
they  may  be  a  central  responsibility  which  are  given 
great  weight  because  so  much  depends  on  them • 
4.  Because  such  systems  tend  to  be  expensive,  there  is 
pressure  to  find  new  uses  for  existing data  to  help 
justify the  cost. 
5.  Access  to  the  data· may  be  con·trolled  by  a  central 
authority  (the  database  administrator)  so  that  a  user 
cannot  readily  access  data other  than  that  which  he  is 
considered  to  need • 
6.  The  software  which  controls  the  user's  access  to  the 
data  may  be  so  complicated  that  the  inspector  cannot 
be  sure  that  there  are  no  loopholes  p~rmitt!ng 
unauthorised  access:  indeed,  the  people  who  create  and 
maintain  the  software  must  be  able  to  bypass  the 
normal  barriers. 
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7.  The  data  is  stored  in  a  complicated  form.such  that 
useful  access  except  by  the  normal  software  (and 
therefore  subject  to  the  central  authority)  is 
possible  only  for  specialists. 
8.  For  the  same  reason,  a  "complete  listing"  of  the 
data,  which  the  inspector  might  wish  to  examine  for 
unauthorised  entries,  may  be  meaningless;  such 
forbidden  data  could  be  distributed  piecemeal  in  a 
way  which  would  not  be  noticed. 
9.  Relatedly,  data  may  be  "erased"  by  destroying  the 
link  by  which  it is  normally  accessed,  rather  than  by 
obliterating  the  data;  such  data  may  still  be 
accessible  by  special  means. 
10  The  boundary  of  a  data  subject's  record  may  be 
undefined  (5.4.2.2),  as  the  database  system  may  be 
able  to  cope  with  data  chains  containing  any  number 
of  links,  e.g.  data  subject's wife's mother's  car's 
colour.  Apart  from  the  question  of  deciding  how  far 
along  this  chain  the  interests of  the  data  subject 
run,  there  is  the  duty  of  not  improperly  disclosing 
data  which  refers  to  another  person. 
In  this list are  several  at present  unresolved  problems, 
and  in  this  respect  the  powers  of  inspection  of 
sophisticated  database  systems  must  be  considered 
incomplete. 
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6.8.15  Undisclosed  systems 
There  has  been  public  concern  expressed  (Jl)  that  someone 
could  operate  a  system·outside  a  data protection  law  by 
taking  care  that  it was  not  noticed  (e.g.  by  ignoring  a 
legal  requirement  for  notification  of  the  existence  of 
the  system),  and  thus  avoid  its being  subject  to 
inspection.  The  suggestion  has  been  made  that  this  is  a 
serious  danger  which  makes  a  nonsense  of  data protection 
laws • 
Although  it is strictly speaking  outside  the  present 
study  (which  is  concerned  with  inspecting  the  identified 
system),  the  problem of detecting  undisclosed  systems 
seems  sufficiently  near  and  important  to  deserve  brief 
discussion  here.  Once  again  the  risk  analysis  method 
(6.2.2)  is  helpful: 
1.  There  must  be  a  reason  for  the  system  being 
undisclosed.  The  evidence  of  the  small  number  of 
published  cases  of  abuse  of  personal  data  reveals 
commonplace  reasons  such  as  human  error,  laziness  and 
cost-saving  as  much  more  important  than  the  sort  of 
sinister  deliberate exploitation  which  could  point  an 
inspector  to  a  small  group  of  systems.  However, 
motivation  to  abuse  is  mentioned  above  (6.4.2  item  3) 
as  a  factor  conducive  to  inspection  • 
b-ILl ,. 
2.  The  undisclosed  system  must  have  the  means  to  operate. 
The  Swedish  DIB  has  discovered  many  unlicensed  systems 
(very  few  of  them  vicious)  by  inspection  of  computer 
bureaux  which  provi9ed  their  means  of  operation. 
3.  There  would  have  to  be  serious  consequences  flowing 
from  the  undisclosed  system.  The  Swedish  DIB  largely 
relies  on  complaints  to  provide  leads  to  objectionable 
systems.  It has  been  remarked  "If  the  abuse  is 
concealed  and  has  no  effect,  then  it doesn't matter." 
{Il:qn.7)  Without  entirely accepting  this  {people  may 
suffer  without  complaining  effectively,  and  there  may 
be  a  serious  time-lag  between  the  offence  and  the 
damage),  one  can  recognize  it as  a  practical 
philosophy. 
It follows  from  this  analysis  that  successful  continuous 
operation  of  an  undisclosed  system  requires  that  all 
three  of  these  aspects  fail  to  attract attention.  The 
risk  therefore  appears  small,  but  it  is  not  negligible. 
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6.8.16  Length  of  inspection visit 
Little has  been  said  about  the  length  of  time  which  the 
inspector  should  spend. in  on-site  inspection  of  the 
system.  The  Swedish  inspectors  usually  allow  about  half 
a  day  (Xl),  even  for  a  computer  bureau  on  which  many 
systems  run  (of  course  much  more  time  is  spent  when  it  is 
considered  necessary) •  The  West  German  Federal 
Commissioner  for  Data  Protection  allows  about  ten  times 
as  much,  and  more  on  big  systems  (2.2.1.2.3).  Computer 
security  consultancy,  which  half  overlaps  data  protection 
inspection,  supports  this  larger  figure • 
Obviously  these  are  qualitatively different  inspections, 
with  different  aims  and  expectations.  No  doubt  an 
Authority  would  vary  its  normal  inspection  strictness 
(6.8.2)  if  circumstances  warranted  it.  The  main 
conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  the  judgement  of  experts 
of  the  appropriate  scale of  inspection  shows  wide 
variations,  and  that  experience  is  not  yet  sufficient  to 
justify dogmatism  • 
6-123 6.9  Acknowledgements  and  references 
6.9.1  Acknowledgements 
The  following  people  gave  much  valuable  material  to 
section  6  of  this  report,  but  cannot  be  held  responsible 
for  any  errors  in  it: 
1.  The  working  party  on  Privacy Audit,  set  up  by  the 
South  West  and  South  Wales  Regional  Committee  of  NCC: 
W.J .E.  Evans  (Ministry  of  Defence,  Devenport)  (Chairman), 
R.N.  Essex  (Imperial  Group,  Bristol), 
M.J.  Holford  (Yeovil  District Countil), 
G.T.  Morrison  (Plessey  Company,  Beeston), 
H.H.W.  Pitcher  (NCC), 
L.R.  Tallis  (Bristol  Polytechnic). 
2.  W.H.  Buckley  (Deloitte Haskins  and  Sells,  Liverpool). 
3.  L. P.  Waring  (NCC)  • 
6-I'L~ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
6.9.2  References 
Bl  The  British Computer  Society code  of  good  practice. 
BCS  1972.  ISBN  0  8?012  083  7 
B2  F.M.  Bancilhon  and  N.Spgratos:  Protection of  information 
in  relational data  bases:  Proc.  third International 
Conference  on  very  large data  bases,  Tokyo,  3-8  October 
1977 • 
Cl  Canadian Institute of  Chartered Accountant:  Computer 
control  guidelines  (Toronto  1970),  Computer  audit 
guidelines  (Toronto  1975) • 
Dl  West  German  Federal  Data Protection Act  (January  1977) 
El  Council  for  Europe  Resolution  (73)  22.  (Private  Sector) 
El  Council  for  Europe-Resolution· (74)  29.  (Public  Sector) 
Fl  French  Law  Number  78-17  concerning  data  processing,  files 
and  liberties 
F2  'Privacy Act  implementation  guidelines  and  responsibilites', 
Federal  Register  40  (July 9,  1975) • 
Gl  The  Cost  of Privacy,  by  Robert  c.  Goldstein  (Honeywell 
Infoamtion  Systems  Inc.,  1975) 
b-/2f" Hl  Records,  Computers  and  the  Rights  of Citizens.  u.s. 
Department  of Health  Education  and  Welfare.  (0  S)  73-94 
(July 1973) 
Il Privacy  - The  Industry View  (Institute of  Data  Processing 
Management  1979) 
Jl "Data Protection Laws:  The  Real  Threat"  by  Rory  Johnstone 
(Computer  Weekly  79-03-08) 
Ll  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Data Protection  (Chairman: 
Sir  Norman  Lindop),  London  HMSO.  Cmnd.7341  (December  1978) 
Pl  Donn  B Parker:  Crime  by  Computer  (New  York  1976). 
ISBN  0-684-14574-X 
P2  J.A.T  Pritchard:  Risk  management  in  action  (NCC  1978). 
ISBN  0-85012-180-9 
Sl  Swedish  Data  Act  (1973:  289) 
S2  Guidelines  for  the  Data  Inspectorate's  inspection  procedures 
in  accordance  with  the  Data  Law  (Swedish  Data  Inspectorate 
1978)  (In  Swedish) 
Wl  L.P.  Waring:  Management  handbook  of  computer  security 
(National  Computing  Centre  Ltd.,  Manchester,  1978) 
W2  K.K.  Wong:  Risk  analysis  and  control  (NCC  1977). 
ISBN  0-85012-179-5 
6-126 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Xl  Private  communication  from  Swedish  DIB 
Yl  Report  of  the  committee  on  privacy  (Chairman: 
The  Rt.  Hon.  Kenneth  Younger),  London  HMSO.  Cmnd.  5012 
(July  1972) • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Contents  of  this  section 
7.1  General  observations 
7.2  Co-operation  between  the  institutes 
7.3  Further  studies 
7.4  Acknowledgement 
7-1 
Page  no • 
7- 3 
7- 8 
7-11 
7-15 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
7.1  General  observations 
The  EEC  has  been  quick  to  realise the  importance  of 
information  technology  and  its  impact  on  the  handling  of 
personal  data,  as  well  as  possible  consequences  for  the 
individual  and  the  Common  Market.  The  whole  area  has 
been  of  such vital  importance  in  social,  political, 
economic  and  legal  ways  that  an  initial  study  of  it 
seemed  to  be  necessary.  This  was  even  more  urgent,  since 
the  technical  and  regulatory  environment  was  constantly 
changing. 
To  find  out  where  to  start and  which  way  to  take  in  this 
environment,  this pilot project  has  been  launched,  with 
the  hope  of  providing  some  signposts  in  the  present 
confusion.  But  a  framework  for  a  long-range  fundamental 
approach  was  also  needed.  With  this double  motivation, 
of  providing  a  closer  view  of  some  present  problems  and 
forming  a  framework  on  which  a  systematic  approach  to  the 
social,  political  and  legal  implications  of  data 
processing  could  be  based,  we  selected,  with  the  help  of 
the  Committee  of  National  Experts,  several  topics  which, 
separate  from  each  other  as  they  might  seem,  nevertheless 
turned  out  to  be  closely  connected . 
The  chosen  problems  reflected  main  issues  of  debate  at 
the  beginning  of  this  study,  and  drew· attention  to  basic 
conflicts  and  structural problems  on  the  level  of 
7-3 - the  problem  area 
- the  solution  (regulation)  area,  and 
- the  economic  environment. 
On  the  level  of  the  problem  area,  the  issue  of 
transborder  data  flow  (section  1)  was  chosen  both  as 
being  the  starting-point of  present  international 
regulation activities  and  as  being  representative  of  one 
of  the  most  contentious  elements  of  existing  legislation. 
Our  main  interest  has  been  to  arrive  at  a  better 
understanding  of  this  complex  area  and  to  find  some 
criteria for  structuring  it.  After  a  panorama  of  the 
' 
most  relevant  environments  in  which  this  traffic  takes 
place,  we  produced  a  classification according  to  the 
physical  means  of  transmission,  the  people  involved  in 
it,  the  nature  of  the  information  transmitted,  the  nations 
involved,  and  the  regulations  applicable  to  this 
exchange.  We  have  outline  the  enormous  difficulties  of 
obtaining quantitative data,  but  we  have  also  identified 
possible  ways  of  getting  this data.  Similar  results  were 
described  for  the  measurement  and  evaluation  of 
transborder  data  flows. 
On  the  level  of  solution  (regulation) ,  we  started  from 
the  present discussion  on  the  practicability of  certain 
data  protection models  and  the  proposals  discussed  by  the 
European  Parliament  which  have  now  become  recommendations. 
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This  led  us  to  a  closer  look  at  the  structure  and 
practice of data  protection  agencies  (section  2),  and  to 
questions  of  legislation  (the  natural  person/other  legal 
entity problem:  section  3)  and  technical  feasibility 
(right of  access:  section 5,  control  procedures: 
section 6) . 
With  regard  to  the data protection agencies,  we  have  been 
able  to  put  together  the  legislative material  on  the 
environment· in  which  these  organisations  have  to  operate 
and  the  evidence  which  we  have  collected  on  the  practice 
which  has  already developed.  From  this  evidence  we  have 
drawn  conclusions  about  the  political  impact  of  these 
organisations  and  their  possible  role  in  international 
co-operation.  We  assume  that  these  agencies  deserve  and 
will  receive  further  study,  both  because  it  is  in  them 
that  actual  experience  accumulates,  and  because  of  their 
importance  for  transborder  data  flow. 
On  the  natural  person/other  legal  entities problem,  we 
have  outlined  major  difficulties:  ensuring  that  the 
intended  protection  is  actually  achieved,  and  defining 
exactly  the  scope  of  appropriate  regulations.  We  have 
suggested  that  solutions  for  the  first  problem  should  be 
sought  through  business  law,  rather  than  from  human 
·rights which  constitute  the  underlying  values .of  the  data 
protection discussion  for  natural  persons.  With  regard 
to  the  seond  difficulty,  we  have  suggested  that  whenever 
7-5 natural  persons  are  in  relevant  contact  with  other  legal 
entities,  data  protection  regulations  should  apply.  We 
have  stated,  however,  that  when  these  other  legal entities 
are  involved,  there  may  be  confusion  with  aims  of  data 
policy other  than  those  of  data privacy. 
Regarding  the  right  of  access  as  one  of  the  most  important 
practical  tools of  data protection,  we  have  looked  into  the 
technical  feasibility  and  convenience  of  these  rights  in 
the  light  of  technological  advances.  We  have  identified 
several  elements  of  that  right,  and  found  that  there  is 
danger  that  some  of  these  elements  may  have  effects  which 
are  adverse  to  privacy  and  security,  and  that  therefore  any 
software  or  hardware  to  be  developed  for  carrying  out  the 
right  of  access  must  take  into  account  these  risks,  and 
should  also  reflect  the  nature  of  man-machine  relations. 
On  the  question  of  control,  of  whether  compliance  with 
data  protection  laws  can  actually  be  checked,  we  have 
tried  to  describe  the  basic  notions  of  such  procedures, 
and  have  arrived  at  some  fundamental  elements  of  such 
procedures  which  are  independent  of  the  regulation 
environment. 
This  has  confirmed  our  general  observation,  that  though 
solutions  may  differ  in  the  particular  approach  according 
to  legal,  social  and  political  traditions,  a  great 
likeness  can  be  observed  in  the  way  in  which  industrialised 
states  have  set  out  to  deal  with  the  problems  which 
information  technologies  pose  for  data  privacy. 
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This  is particularly due  to  the  similarity  in  the 
economic  environment,  which  we  have  analysed  in  section 4 
in  examining  the  economic  problems  caused  by  applying 
these  technologies  i~  these  societies.  We  have  concluded 
that  the  cost problem  of data protection  must  be  examined 
with  greater  care,  since  most  of  the  assessments  made  so 
far  are  only  speculations;  and  that  there  is  considerable 
manoeuvering  space  for  forthcoming  international 
regulations. 
So,  although  the  areas  selected  may  seem  miscellaneous, 
they  identify  and  analyse  the  most  crucial  points  of 
information  control  in  modern  society,  and  present 
exemplary  features  of  data  protection  both  in  its 
national  and  international  environment. 
But  in  the  course  of  our  observation  we  have  come  across 
further  problems,  partly arising  from  the  points  we  have 
analysed,  partly  from  the  system  in  which  they  are 
incorporated.  Before  dealing  with  these  consequences,  we 
have  a  closer  look  at  the  infrastructure  of  this  study 
itself  • 
7-7 7.2  Co-operation  between  the  institutes 
Co-operation  on  this  study  has  been  a  valuable  experience 
in  the  area  of  joint  ~esearch.  This  positive experience 
makes  us  wish  to  enlarge  the  field  of  co-operation  with 
other  similar  research  institutes  in  the  EEC.  The 
multidisciplinary  approach  particularly,  and  the 
possibility of  following  research  results  in  English, 
French  and  German,  have  proved  most  valuable  for  such  a 
project. 
In particular,  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  this  study 
was  to  create  a  basis  for  co-operation  between  the 
participating research  institutes of  the  Community.  In 
fact,  even  during  the  conceptual  and  contractual  stages 
this project  had  been  a  joint effort. 
Looking  back  now  at  these  nearly  two  years  of  co-
operation  on  the  actual  project  and  our  research 
experiences,  we  believe  that  the  wide-ranging  approach 
outlined  in  7.1  could  not  have  been  followed  by  one 
national  research  institute alone.  This  was  not  because 
of  the  means  required,  which  were  rather  modest,  but  for 
deeper  reasons: 
First of all,  the  problems  of  information  technology 
arise  on  an  international  level.  So  only  by  an 
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sources  of  information  be  made  sufficiently available  and 
be  adequately  accessed.  Secondly,  the multidisciplinary 
qualifications provided  by  the  different  institutes  made 
it possible  to  look  i~to these  problems  from  different 
angles.  Finally,  the  differences  in  the  research 
environments  and  traditions  have  shown  us  that  in  spite 
of  these  national  differences,  similar  means  of  approach 
to  solving  the  problems  are  valid. 
So  co-operation  was  achieved,  which  both  maintained 
national  characteristics  and  yet  joined  in  a  common 
effort  to  produce  a  framework  for  analysing  and 
evaluating  the  impact  of  information  technology  on 
personal  data. 
Positive  though  these  experiences  have  been,  there  are 
still several  items  that  we  would  like  to  see  achieved  in 
any  further  similar  ventures . 
One  of  the difficulties of  such  co-operation  is  that  it 
demands  a  high  co-ordination effort  by  the  participating 
institutes.  Though  we  think  that  by  now  an  efficient 
substructure  of  co-operation  between  the  institutes  and 
the  Commission  has  been  achieved,  it must  be  kept  in  mind 
that  we  have  often  been  in  a  position  where  we  had  to 
follow  legislatory  and  political  events  rather  than  to 
help prepare  them,  because  of  the  time  which  would  have 
been  consumed  in  creating  a  structure  for  co-operation  . 
7-9 In  future  we  would  therefore  favour  an  approach  which 
provided  results  more  fluently.  We  feel  certain that  we 
could  then  provide  the  Commission,  as  well  as  the 
Committee  of National  experts,  the  member  countries  and 
other  interested parties,  with  the  kind  of  help  which  is 
needed  during  the  preparation of  decisions.  We  suggest 
that,  if there  are  further  activities of  this  type,  means 
and  organisational  structures  should  be  developed  to  give 
joint study  groups  more  time  to  work  together  in  the  same 
environment,  rather  than  only  to  meet  occasionally. 
Now  that  we  know  how  to  work  together,  we  feel  that  the 
time  has  come  to  ask  other  research  institutes within  the 
Community  who  have  similar  interests  to  join  further 
ventures.  We  believe  this  can  only  help  to  broaden  and 
deepen  the  study. 
On  the  basis  of  these deliberations  and  from  our  joint 
efforts,  we  offer  some  proposals  for  further  research. 
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7.3  Further  studies 
Although data protection legislation has  reached  a  stage 
of  consolidation  on  both  the  national  and  the 
international  levels,  we  still observe  several  issues 
which  may  become  of  crucial  importance  for  the  free  flow 
of  information  in  the  Community  and  for  safeguarding  EEC 
citizens for  whom  national  legislation was  put  forward: 
1.  Nations  with  data protection  legislation can  review 
it in  the  light of  the  experience  of  their  data 
inspection  agencies  and  public opinion.  This  seems  to 
lead  to  the  exemption  of  trivial data processing,  and 
to easier  procedures  for  the  commonest  data  banks 
which  contain data  that  does  not  seem  dangerous.  At 
the  same  time,  a  more  careful  approach  is being  made 
to  specify  sectors  of  data processing  like public 
health,  social security,  employment  agencies,  research 
and  national  security.  Among  these  sectors,  all 
except  perhaps  the  last deserve  the  attention of  the 
EEC,  since  it is  not  altogether  clear  what 
consequences  this more  sectoral  approach  will  have • 
2.  Though  international  regulations  have  been  diafted,  it 
is not  clear  when  and  how  the different  nations  will 
respond  to  them,  and  how  practical  they  will  prove  in 
day-to-day data traffic.  This  is  of  especial 
importance  with  regard  to  data  traffic  between  EEC  and 
non-EEC  countries.  This  uncertainty  is partly due  to 
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based  on  assumptions  rather  than  conclusions.  Here 
the  actual  practice  and  decisions of  the data 
protection agencies  on  transborder  data  flow  will  be 
of vital  importance. 
3.  The  scope  of  data protection  has  grown  widely  in 
recent discussions.  Issues  like  the  balance  of  power, 
employment,  national  sovereignty,  freedom  of 
information,  the  'New  World  Information Order'  and 
economic  dependency  have  been  closely mingled  with  the 
former  issues  of  privacy  and  openness.  This 
enlargement  of  issues  has  led  to  controversies  on  data 
protection  issues,  and  has  widened  the  considerations 
for  regulations  to  non-physical  legal  entities,  as 
well  as  to  economic  data.  The  consequences  of  these 
complications  for  existing data protection  regulation, 
and  for  the  whole  issue  of  information  as  an  economic 
good  have  not  yet  been  sufficiently analysed. 
4.  While  regulation activities  have  reached  some  degree 
of consolidation,  technological  development  has  not 
stopped.  It  is still dubious  how  existing  national 
and  international  regulations  can  react  to  new 
development  like satellite communication  and  micro-
computers. 
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5.  In  addition  to  existing  regulations,  there  are still 
more  far-reaching  proposals  for  regulating  information 
flows  and  giving  undue  protectionism that must  not  be 
ignored  in  further.policy-making.  This  applies mainly 
to  the  recommendations  of  the  European  Parliament,  but 
also  to  further  activities of  the  Council  of  Europe  in 
the  area  of  access  to  government  data.  Whereas  the 
former  poses  legal  and  organisational  problems  whose 
extent  remains  to  be  analysed,  the  latter  may  become 
important  to  present data protection  regulations,  and 
may  pose  problems  of  competition,  as  experiences  with 
the u.s.  Freedom  of  Information  Act  suggest  • 
6.  Furthermore,  the  economic  consequences  of  the  drafted 
and  proposed  international  agreements  are  far  from 
being  clear  and  demand  further  study  . 
7.  Another  issue  which  has  been  observed,  but  not 
explored,  during  the  present  study,  is  the  influence 
of  tariffs  and  regulatory  aspects  of 
telecommunications  in  the  development  of  information 
flows • 
These  uncertainties  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  experience 
with  our  interdisciplinary  international  research  team  on 
the other,  lead  us  to  suggestions  for  further  research. 
We  have  identified  the  following  research  topics: 
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1.  Technical  problems  of  ensuring  privacy,  and  data 
protection problems  arising  from  new  technologies 
2.  Data protection  r~ghts of  the  EEC  citizen 
3.  Data  protection  and  organisational  policy 
4.  Possible  role  and  structure of  a  European  data 
protection control  body 
5.  Economic  aspects of  harmonization  procedures 
6.  Protection  of  research data 
7.  Transferability of data protection models 
8.  Assessment  of  information policy  and  legal  problems 
with  regard  to  telecommunications  and  data  flows 
between  EEC  and  non-EEC  coun·tr ies. 
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